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UNBUNDLING FREEDOM IN THE
SHARING ECONOMY
DEEPA DAS ACEVEDO*
Courts and scholars point to the sharing economy as proof that our
labor and employment infrastructure is obsolete because it rests on a narrow
and outmoded idea that only workers subjected to direct, personalized
control by their employers need work-related protections and benefits. Since
they diagnose the problem as being our system's emphasis on control, these
critics have long called for reducing or eliminating the primacy of the
"control test" in classifying workers as either protected employees or
unprotected independent contractors. Despite these persistent criticisms,
however, the concept of control has been remarkably sticky in scholarly and
judicial circles.
This Article argues that critics have misdiagnosed the reason why the
control test is an unsatisfying method of classifying workers and dispensing
work-related safeguards. Control-based analysis is faulty because it only
captures one of the two conflicting ways in which workers, scholars, and
decisionmakers think about freedom at work. One of these ways, freedom-
as-non-interference, is adequately captured by the control test. The other,
freedom-as-non-domination, is not. The tension between these two
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conceptions of freedom, both deeply entrenched in American culture,
explains why the concept of control has been both 'faulty" and "sticky"
when it comes to worker classification.
Drawing on a first-of-its-kind body of ethnographic fieldwork among
workers and policymakers across several sharing economy industries, this
Article begins by showing how workers themselves conceptualize freedom as
both non-interference and non-domination. It then goes on to show that both
these conceptualizations offreedom also exist in case law and statutory law
pertaining to work. In doing so, the Article demonstrates that there is no
great divide between work law and work practices and that, if anything, the
problem is that classification doctrine reflects and reinforces an irresolvable
tension in the way lay and legal actors think about freedom at work.
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INTRODUCTION
In 2015, the Northern District of California issued one of the most
widely cited opinions on employment regulation in the sharing economy.'
The dispute in Cotter v. Lyft was a relatively standard one-whether a
company had misclassified a particular set of workers as independent
contractors when in fact they ought to have been employees2 -and the
I. See generally Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015). Cotter has been cited
in at least twelve decisions and as many as thirty-seven law review articles in the three years following
the decision. See, e.g., Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc, 242 F. Supp. 3d 910, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2017);
Bekele v. Lyft, Inc., 199 F. Supp. 3d 284, 303 (D. Mass. 2016); Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking
Economy: Uber, Information & Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1626 n.14 (2017).
2. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1069.
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substance of the court's analysis and ruling were similarly routine.3 What
made the Cotter opinion stand out, aside from its efforts to grapple with an
unfamiliar economic space, was Judge Chhabria's snappy summary of a
widely recognized problem in worker classification law. Because the
standard "control" based test for worker classification suggested that Lyft
both did and did not control the drivers who operate on its platform (and that
consequently the drivers could be either employees or independent
contractors) "the jury," Judge Chhabria observed in closing, "will be handed
a square peg and asked to choose between two round holes."
4
The common law control test purports to distinguish employees from
independent contractors on the grounds that employees enjoy less freedom
in the "manner and means" of their work and thus merit a host of work-
related safeguards.5 Judge Chhabria argued that the misfit between legal
categories and work practices stemmed from the fact that a "20th Century"
test was being applied to a "21st Century problem" like the sharing
economy6 -but in truth, the control test seems to have always suffered badly
from cubism. Before Lyft drivers, for instance, there were FedEx drivers
whose facial hair and sock color were dictated by FedEx and McDonald's
workers whose speech and hand motions were mandated by McDonald's, all
of whom were sometimes found to be independent contractors (and
sometimes not).7 Indeed, for virtually the entirety of its existence, the control
3. See id. ("We generally understand an employee to be someone who works under the direction
of a supervisor, for an extended or indefinite period of time, with fairly regular hours, receiving most or
all his income from that one employer...."). See also Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490
U.S. 730, 751-52 (1989) (listing various factors that courts consider in making determinations of
employee status); United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 716 (1947) (same); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 220(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1958) (same); Richard R. Carlson, Why the Law Still Can't Tell an
Employee When It Sees'One and How It Ought to Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 310
(2001) (same).
4. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
5. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (citing Reid, 490 U.S. at 740).
While there is no definitive articulation of the control test, I will refer to it in the singular for ease of
reading and because all versions of the test emphasize the importance of employer control over the
"manner and means" of performance. Accord Carlson, supra note 3, at 299.
6. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081. See also Senator Mark R. Warner, The American Dream Is
Fading jbr Millions of Freelancers. Portable Benefits Could Save It, SENATE.GOV (July 5, 2017),
https://www.wamer.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2017/7/the-american-dream-is-fading-for-millions-of-
freelancers-portable-benefits-could-save-it (calling the United States' approach of linking social safety
benefits to employers a "20th-century approach" that is "failing workers in the 21st-century economy").
7. See Deepa Das Acevedo, Invisible Bosses br Invisible Workers, or Why the Sharing Economy
Is Actually Minimally Disruptive, 2017 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 35, 50, 58 (discussing specific work practices
that allow franchisors like McDonald's to exercise control over their franchisees' direct employees as
well as some companies like FedEx to exercise control over their independent contractors). Compare
Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding FedEx drivers are
employees), and Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1241 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (denying
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test has proven unsatisfactory to courts and scholars-and, at least once, to
Congress-because it is inefficient and often seems inaccurate.' But if
control-based analysis is so deeply problematic, why has it also been so
tough to get away from?
The concept of control has proven both "faulty" and "sticky" when it
comes to worker classification because it captures one-but only one-of
the two conflicting ways in which courts, scholars, and workers themselves
think about freedom at work. One of these ways, which is more prominent
as well as adequately captured by the control test's "manner and means"
analysis, is a classically liberal understanding of freedom as non-
interference.9 The second, less influential (but still widely visible) model is
a thicker vision of freedom as non-domination.'0 These competing
conceptions shine through with striking clarity in the sharing economy, but
they are also apparent in other business contexts and clearly discernible from
a sky-view analysis of our labor and employment infrastructure. The tension
between these two visions of freedom is why scholarship and jurisprudence
on worker classification has been filled with criticisms of the control test, yet
unable to meaningfully move beyond it.
This paper makes two contributions to legal scholarship. First, it speaks
to labor and employment law scholars by showing that control-based worker
summary judgment for defendant McDonald's on grounds that McDonald's may be liable for labor code
violations involving its franchisees' employees under a theory of ostensible agency), with FedEx Home
Delivery v. NLRB, 849 F.3d 1123, 1124 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (finding FedEx drivers are independent
contractors), and Salazar v. McDonald's Corp., No. 14-cv-02096-RS, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108764, at
*49-50 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2016) (finding that McDonald's is not a joint employer of its franchisees'
employees).
8. See infra notes 14, 15, 30, 31, 47 and accompanying text (discussing scholarship and
jurisprudence critical of the existing classification regime and control based analysis). See also Bruce
Goldstein et al., Enfbrcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop: Rediscovering the
Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1106 (1999) (arguing that in adopting the
much broader "suffer or permit" standard of employee status instead of the control test, "Congress's
purpose was precisely to expand coverage under the [Fair Labor Standards Act] far beyond the common
law").
9. Throughout this paper I will rely on Isaiah Berlin's canonical definitions of positive and
negative freedom and Philip Pettit's interpretation of freedom as non-domination. ISAIAH BERLIN, TWO
CONCEPTS OF LIBERTY 7 8, 16 (1958); PHILIP PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY
AND MODEL OF DEMOCRACY 1-18 (2012); PHILIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM
AND GOVERNMENT 19-27 (1997). See also ALEX GOUREVITCH, FROM SLAVERY TO THE COOPERATIVE
COMMONWEALTH: LABOR AND REPUBLICAN LIBERTY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 7-17 (2015);
Gerald M. Stevens, The Test of the Employment Relation, 38 MICH. L. REV. 188, 197-98 (1939) (arguing
that American courts have "turned for guidance to a more certain and indisputable principle" in which
"control must have meant... actual interference and superintendence").
10. Non-domination is most concerned with the presence or absence of boundaries on external
interferences rather than with the interferences themselves. For illustrations using the sharing economy,
see inira Section II.C. See also PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 1-18.
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classifications, problematic as they may be, are linked to a particular vision
of individual autonomy that is very compelling in America. While the
consequences of courts' reliance on control often seem perverse (as when
innumerable workers are denied employee status because they are not
directly or sufficiently controlled by their respective employers), the
conception of personal freedom behind that analysis demands erious and
careful treatment. Critics of the current classification regime do themselves
no favors by trying to eliminate, supplant, or declaw control-based analysis.
This is not so much because doing so constitutes the usual mistake involving
babies and bathwater, but because critics fail to recognize that the baby and
the bathwater are in some ways indistinguishable.
Second, this paper contributes to a broader conversation within the legal
academy about the role of qualitative social science in the study of law. As I
have argued elsewhere, the kinds of insights gleaned from ethnographic
research are different from those facilitated by other empirical (and
especially quantitative) forms of social science, but they are hardly
incommensurable with the interests or the intellectual values of legal
scholars."' Here, I use ethnographic fieldwork on the sharing economy as
well as legal analysis of our labor and employment infrastructure to reveal
the twin conceptions of freedom described above and to show why the
tension between them creates problems for employee classification doctrine.
The type of "cultivated attentiveness" that makes such a doctrinal critique
possible is precisely why ethnographic research is a different but profoundly
valuable mode of interdisciplinary legal scholarship. 
12
Part I begins with a brief overview of the origins of our classification
system that highlights the centrality of freedom as an analytic rubric. I then
detail the stakes of employee status as well as the criticisms that the existing
system has provoked. Part II contains the ethnographic heart of the Article.
Section II.A uses ethnographic research to demonstrate that workers in the
sharing economy sometimes value independent contractor status and
associate it with freedom-as-non-interference, while Section II.B shows that
11. Deepa Das Acevedo, Temples, Courts, and Dynamic Equilibrium in the Indian Constitution,
64 AM. J. COMP. L. 555, 560 (2016).
12. Kaushik Sunder Rajan, Anthropological Fieldwork Methods 1 (2015) (unpublished syllabus)
(emphasis in original) (on file with author). Ethnography is often described as a research method based
on participant-observation, and this description is not wrong. But Kaushik Sunder Rajan offers a far more
nuanced take on the ethnographic method and its value in his syllabus for a graduate-level methods class
at the University of Chicago. "What makes good ethnography work ... ," Sunder Rajan writes, "is the
fact that the ethnographer is capable of attending to things that her interlocutors might attend to differently
(ignore, naturalize, fetishize, valorize, take for granted, etc.)." Id. Consequently, "the fundamental
problem of fieldwork involves the cultivation of attentiveness." Id.
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sharing economy workers and their advocates rely on a conception of
freedom that is more akin to non-domination when they express concern
about the lack of autonomy in this type of labor. Part III draws on case law
and statutory law to demonstrate that these conflicting visions of freedom
also exist in our labor and employment law infrastructure.
I. DEFINING WORK RELATIONSHIPS
The building blocks of work law are imports from elsewhere: the
categories "employer" and "employee" arrived from the law of agency via
vicarious liability, while the characterization of the employment relationship
itself comes from contract law.13 Labor and employment scholars have long
bemoaned this lack of locally cultivated concepts (particularly as it relates to
worker classification) because they believe that it creates a misfit at the
foundation of our regulatory infrastructure.14 And, they argue, the primary
cause of that misfit is the importance of control in the allocation of the
protections and benefits described below. 
15
But scholars and courts misdiagnose the precise nature of the problem:
control is important, to be sure, and that importance derives from
classification doctrine's link with agency law-but control is really just a
proxy for measuring worker freedom.16 As the categories "employee" and
"independent contractor" developed over the nineteenth century, placing
13. See Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 17 (1915), noted in Alan Story, Employer Speech, Union
Representation Elections, and the First Amendment, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 356, 406-07 n.264
(1995); Bower v. Peate, I Q.B.D. 321 (1876), noted in O.W. Holmes, Agency, 4 HARV. L. REV. 345,347
n.3 (1891) (discussing the proposition that a master/servant relationship is no different than other agency
relationships inasmuch as the servant's actions are attributable to the master).
14. See, e.g., BRISHEN ROGERS, AM. CONSTITUTION SoC'Y, REDEFINING EMPLOYMENT FOR THE
MODERN ECONOMY 3 (2016); Franklin G. Snyder, The Pernicious Eff.ect of Employment Relationships
on the Law of Contracts, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 33, 36 (2003); Roscoe T. Steffen, Independent
Contractor and the Good Life, 2 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 507 (1935); Noah D. Zatz, Beyond
Misclassification: Tackling the Independent Contractor Problem Without Redefining Employment, 26
ABA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 279, 282 (2011).
15. V.B. Dubal, Wage Slave or Entrepreneur?: Contesting the Dualism ofLegal Worker Identities,
105 CALIF. L. REV. 65, 93 (2017); Julia Tomasetti, The Contracting/Producing Ambiguity and the
Collapse of the Means/Ends Distinction in Employment, 66 S.C. L. REV. 315, 356 (2014); Nancy E.
Dowd, The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. & MARY L. REV. 75, 86
(1984).
16. On the centrality of "freedom" in American work law see CHRISTOPHER L. TOMLINS, LAW,
LABOR, AND IDEOLOGY IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC, at xv (1993) (describing various areas of
nineteenth century law as "tending during the period under study to move toward a representation of
working life in voluntaristic terms ... [an] empowering definition of individual freedom") and Marion
Crain, Work, Free Will and Law, 24 EMPLOY. RESP. & RTS. J. 279, 280 (2012) (discussing competing
meanings of"work" in the United States but stating that "[t]he dominant image of work in American law
is as an exercise of free will").
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individual workers into one bucket or the other was meant to reflect a sense
that some workers were merely agents of their employers and not really free
to act independently.17 It followed that employers sometimes ought to be
responsible for injuries caused or incurred by those workers ("employees")
who relinquished freedom in the performance of their tasks because, after
all, it was the employers themselves who had dictated the "manner and
means" in which tasks were to be performed.'8 As it turns out, however,
"manner and means" analysis only captures one of the ways in which
workers, scholars, judges, and even occasionally legislators have thought
about what it means to be free at work.
That is where the trouble really lies-in the overlooked complexity of
the concept of freedom. Unlike critiques that emphasize the narrowness of
control-based analysis or the different goals of agency versus work law, an
analysis that focuses on freedom can explain both the faultiness and the
stickiness of the control test. Otherwise it becomes mystifying, as indeed it
has been to generations of critics, why a test that dispenses the safeguards of
employee status as inefficiently and stingily as the control test nonetheless
retains such conceptual punch.19
A. WHAT'S IN A NAME?
The United States funnels an extraordinary range of protections and
benefits through work relationships. Moreover, the vast majority of these
17. See, e.g., Boswell v. Laird, 8 Cal. 469, 489 (1857) (holding that "[s]omething more than the
mere right of selection, on the part of the principal, is essential" to a master and servant relationship).
Boswell added that "[t]he relation between the parties was that of independent contractors" because the
co-defendants "were engaged in an independent employment in the construction of a work which was
entrusted entirely to their skill." Id at 490, 494. For discussions of the development of "employee" as a
category of free labor during the nineteenth century, see generally KAREN ORREN, BELATED FEUDALISM:
LABOR, THE LAW, AND LIBERAL DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (1991); ROBERT J. STEINFELD,
THE INVENTION OF FREE LABOR: THE EMPLOYMENT RELATION IN ENGLISH & AMERICAN LAW AND
CULTURE, 1350 1870 (1991); TOMLINS, supra note 16; Christopher L. Tomlins, Law and Power in the
Employment Relationship, in LABOR LAW IN AMERICA 71 (Christopher L. Tomlins & Andrew J. King,
eds., 1992); John Fabian Witt, Rethinking the Nineteenth-Century Employment Contract, Again, 18 LAW
& HIST. REV. 627 (2000).
18. Gasal v. CHS Inc., 798 F. Supp. 2d 1007, 1013 (D.N.D. 2011) ("The rationale for the doctrine
of respondeat superior is based on the employer's right o control the employee's conduct.").
19. Perhaps the best indication that the control test's persistence is itself an object of puzzlement
and anxiety for labor and employment scholars is the frequency with which they refer to its inadequacy,
complexity, unfairness, and attempted replacement. See, e.g., Guy Davidov, The Reports of My Death
are Greatly Exaggerated: "Employee' as a Viable (Though Overly-Used) Legal Concept, in BOUNDARIES
AND FRONTIERS OF LABOUR LAW: GOALS AND MEANS IN THE REGULATION OF WORK 133 (Guy Davidov
& Brian Langille eds., 2006); Marc Linder, Dependent and Independent Contractors in Recent U.S. Labor
Law: An Ambiguous Dichotomy Rooted in Simulated Statutory Purposelessness, 21 COMP. LAB. L. &
POL'Y J. 187, 190 (1999); Stevens, supra note 9, at 203; Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 317-18.
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safeguards, at both federal and state levels, are only available to workers who
are categorized as employees.2 ° Core safeguards linked to employee status
include anti-discrimination and harassment protections based on protected
categories like race, religion, sex, national origin, disability, and age
(including the duty to accommodate, where applicable);21 job protections for
family and medical leave;22 equal pay guarantees as between men and
women;23 minimum pay guarantees and rules about when over-time rates of
pay should kick in;24 fiduciary standards regarding health and retirement
benefits (as well as the bulk of such benefits themselves);25 workplace safety
protections;26 and, of course, protections for workers who engage in
concerted or union activity.27 All of these and more hinge on being the right
kind of worker for the right kind of employer and even, sometimes, being in
the right kind of industry.
To be sure, some of these safeguards, like unionization rights or
workplace safety protections, are self-evidently related to work, although not
necessarily to employee status. Others, like the imposition of certain
fiduciary standards regarding the management of health and retirement
benefits, have no necessary connection to work at all-as Americans partly
began to experience under the Affordable Care Act. 28 This is not the place
20. See infra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-3 (2012). Note that the Civil Rights Act of
1866 does not limit its protection against racial discrimination in the formation of contracts (including
employment contracts) to "employees." 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a) (2012).
22. Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(4) (2012). Note that the FMLA
adopts the FLSA's "suffer or permit" definition of "employ." Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 USC
§ 201, § 203(g) (2012).
23. Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (2012).
24. 29 USC § 201, §§ 203(d)-(e) (2012) (defining "employees" and "employers" to whom the Act
applies); id. § 206 (establishing minimum wage provisions for employees); Portal to Portal Act of 1947,
29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (2012).
25. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1002 (2012) (stating that
ERISA only applies to "employees"). Note that ERISA does not require employers to offer any kind of
health or retirement benefit plan at all-"it merely regulates retirement promises that are made." Paul M.
Secunda, The Behavioral Economic Casejbr Paternalistic Workplace Retirement Plans, 91 IND. L.J. 505,
540 (2016). This is why "[t]he aggregate national retirement deficit number is currently estimated to be
$4.13 trillion for all U.S. households where the head of household is between 25 and 64." Id. at 507-08.
Employer sponsored health and welfare plans were similarly voluntaristic; however, this began to change
as a result of the "employer mandate" contained within the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
42 U.S.C. §18001 (2012).
26. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-52 (2012).
27. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012).
28. Although the Affordable Care Act did not entirely detach health insurance savings from work
relationships, it created a system of "exchanges" on which individuals can purchase health insurance
plans that are not contingent on employer sponsorship. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2487 (2015)
("[T]he Act requires the creation of an "Exchange" in each State where people can shop for insurance,
usually online.") (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1803 1(b)(1)).
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to rehash longstanding debates on the wisdom of tying safeguards to work in
general; for better or worse, our social safety net is unlikely to become
meaningfully detached from the work relationship in the foreseeable
future.29 Rather, it is simply worth noting that the range of benefits tied to
work is largely co-extensive with the range of benefits tied to employee
status because doing so explains why so many scholars (to say nothing of
workers, worker advocates, and governmental actors across branches and
jurisdictions) have been vexed by the issue of worker classification: many of
the procedural and substantive safeguards that greatly contribute to a decent
life are funneled through employee status.
30
Despite the undeniable importance of worker classification, it is
notoriously difficult to determine whether any individual worker is an
employee or an independent contractor.31 Statutes are of little help: several
of the most significant federal acts contain delightfully circular language like
"[t]he term 'employee' means an individual employed by an employer."32 In
a 1992 case involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA), the Supreme Court held that such circular language reflected
congressional reliance on the "common understanding ... of the difference
between an employee and an independent contractor" that in turn mandated
judicial reliance on the common law control test.33 Courts soon extended the
29. See ALAIN SUPiOT, BEYOND EMPLOYMENT: CHANGES IN WORK AND THE FUTURE OF LABOUR
LAW IN EUROPE 26-57 (2001) (not rejecting the logic of tying safeguards to work even though one of its
central conclusions was that the "employment relationship in its existing form has reached its limits"),
noted in David Marsden, Introduction: Can the Right Employment Institutions Create Jobs?, in LABOUR
LAW AND SOCIAL INSURANCE IN THE NEW ECONOMY: A DEBATE ON THE SUPIOT REPORT 1, 3, 9 (David
Marsden & Hugh Stephenson eds., 2001).
30. Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor's Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 373, 378-83 (2008)
(discussing the prevalence, costs to workers, and advantages to employers of misclassifying employees
as independent contractors).
31. See, e.g., NLRB v. United Ins. Co. of Am., 390 U.S. 254,258 (1968); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns,
Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 120-22 (1944), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., v. Darden, 503 U.S.
318 (1992); FedEx Home Delivery v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 496-99 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Indeed, the
Supreme Court of Mississippi's frustration was such that it declared (in 1931) that,
[t]here have been many attempts to define precisely what is meant by the term "independent
contractor;" but the variations in the wording of these attempts have resulted only in
establishing the proposition that it is not possible within the limitations of language to lay down
a concise definition that will fumish any universal formula, covering all cases.
Kisner v. Jackson, 132 So. 90, 91 (Miss. 1931).
32. For this type of circular definition see, for example, Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(ADEA) § 1 (f), 29 U.S.C. § 630(t) (2012); Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611(3) (2006);
Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (2012); Americans with Disability Act (ADA) § 101(4), 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(4) (2012); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) § 3,29 U.S.C. § 1002(6) (2012).
33. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 325, 327 (citing Cmty. for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) for the principle that "Congress means an agency law definition
for 'employee' unless it clearly indicates otherwise" and stating that "[algency law principles
comport ... with our recent precedents and with the common understanding, reflected in those
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holding to statutes beyond ERISA so that now the control test is the default
for federal work law protections.
34
Case law has also been of little help despite the fact that "the real work
of identifying 'employees' ... has always been in the courts."35 In the course
of trying to implement the Fair Labor Standards Act's ("FLSA") broader
definition of what it means to be an employer-to "suffer or permit to work,"
rather than to control the means and manner of performance-some courts
developed the "economic realities" test as an alternative to control-based
analysis.36 This new test was meant to expand the scope of analysis by
considering workers' economic dependence on their employers and
functional (rather than merely nominal) employer control.37 But the
economic realities test has also come to draw criticism, partly because its
multiple factors are open to divergent interpretations and partly because
many of those factors bear a curiously strong resemblance to factors that are
considered under the common law test.
38
B. WHAT'S THE MATTER WITH CONTROL?
The two criticisms of the economic realities test mirror the primary
complaints about worker classification doctrine more broadly: it offers little
guidance and it really always boils down to control-based analysis.39 That
tendency to revert to measuring and weighing control is in turn troubling
because the control test seems prone to excluding workers with diminished
freedom from the agreed upon suite of employment related safeguards.
40
precedents, of the difference between an employee and an independent contractor").
34. See, e.g., Slingluffv. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 425 F.3d 861, 867-68
(10th Cir. 2005) (applying Darden to the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970); Birchem v.
Knights of Columbus, 116 F.3d 310, 312-13 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Darden to the American with
Disabilities Act of 1990); Frankel v. Bally, Inc., 987 F.2d 86, 89-90 (2d Cir. 1993) (applying Darden to
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967).
35. Carlson, supra note 3, at 298.
36. See, e.g., West v. J.O. Stevenson, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 3d 751, 763 & n.6 (E.D.N.C. 2016) (noting
that "in the labor relations context, the Fourth Circuit has instructed courts to examine only the economic
realities of the employment relationship" because of "the more expansive definition of 'employ' used in
the labor relations statutes" including the "FMLA or similarly-defined [FLSA]").
37. See id. See also U.S. v. Rosenwasser, 323 U.S. 360, 362-63 (1945) (noting that the FLSA
definition of employment was created intentionally broad in order to fulfill the remedial purpose of the
act); Zheng v. Liberty Apparel Co. Inc., 355 F.3d 61, 66 (2d Cir. 2003) (same).
38. See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada, Beyond "Economic Realities ": The Case for
Amending Federal Employment Discrimination Laws to Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L.
REV. 239, 249-50 (1997) (citing the pre-Darden case, Broussardv. L.H. Bossie, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158 (5th
Cir. 1986), as an example of the continued importance of control even under the economic realities test).
39. See id. at 249.
40. See NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127 (1944) ("Unless the common-law tests
are to be imported and made exclusively controlling, without regard to the statute's purposes, it cannot
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Sometimes the exclusion simply occurs when workers are labeled
independent contractors rather than employees of the companies they work
for. This is the case with the decades-long litigation over FedEx delivery
drivers, whom the Ninth Circuit described as being subjected to "exquisite"
forms of control, notwithstanding FedEx's claims that they were
independent contractors.41 But critics also fault the control test for narrowly
construing who counts as an "employer" and thus absolving companies of
their obligations under various statutes. This is the impetus behind efforts to
hold franchisors like McDonald's liable as joint employers of their
franchisees' direct employees.
42
It is precisely this narrowness, critics argue, that led Congress to
abandon the common law definition of "employee" when drafting the FLSA
and to instead adopt the wider "suffer or permit" standard used in state child
labor laws;43 that led the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Hearst to argue for a
"purposive" reading of the National Labor Relations Act, with its more
expansive understanding of "employee" status;44 and that led various federal
be irrelevant that the particular workers in these cases are subject, as a matter of economic fact, to the
evils the statute was designed to eradicate .... "). See also Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, From Amazon
to Uber: Defining Employment in the Modern Economy, 96 B.U. L. Rev. 1673, 1677 (2016); Guy
Davidov, The Three Axes of Employment Relationships: A Characterization of Workers in Need of
Protection, 52 U. TORONTO L.J. 357, 363-64 (2002); Linder, supra note 19, at 190.
41. Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 990-91 (citing Estrada v. FedEx
Ground Package System, Inc., 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327, 336 (Ct. App. 2007), in which drivers subject to the
same Operating Agreement as the Alexander plaintiffs were found to be employees based on "FedEx's
control over every exquisite detail of the drivers' performance").
42. Ochoa v. McDonald's Corp., 133 F. Supp. 3d 1228, 1239-40 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (allowing
plaintiffs to move forward with their claim that McDonald's is a joint employer alongside its franchisees
on a theory of ostensible agency); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 2 (2015)
(revising the Board's joint employer standard to require only "[r/eserved authority to control terms and
conditions of employment" and that such control need not "be exercised directly and immediately")
(emphasis added).
43. Goldstein et al., supra note 8, at 1094-1101 (arguing that Congress adopted the FLSA's "suffer
or permit" language from state child labor laws with the specific intention to ensure that the Act would
cover workers not considered employees under the common law control test). Similarly, a 2016
Administrator's Interpretation (Al) issued by the Obama Department of Labor specified that the
Department would henceforth distinguish between "vertical" and "horizontal" joint employment and
apply the "economic realities" test to determine vertical joint employer status instead of current FLSA
regulations-a move that commentators immediately interpreted as reflecting "the agency's longstanding
priority to loosen joint employment standards." Tammy McCutchen & Michael J. Lotito, DOL Issues
Guidance on Joint Employment Under FLSA, LITTLER (Jan. 20, 2016), https://www.littler.com
/publication-press/publication/dol-issues-guidance-joint-employment-under-flsa. The Al was later
withdrawn by the Trump Department of Labor. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, US Secretary of
Labor Withdraws Joint Employment, Independent Contractor Informal Guidance, Release No. 17-0807-
NAT (June 7, 2017), https://www.dol.gov/newsroom/releases/opa/opa20170607.
44. Dubal, supra note 15, at 85. A similar impulse led the Fourth Circuit to find that although
Darden probably would not qualify as an employee under the control test, that outcome was inconsistent
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courts to embrace an economic realities analysis that accounts for worker
dependence.45 A survey of worker classification literature brings such efforts
to minimize or supplant control-based analysis into sharp relief, but it also
reveals that courts, regulators, and even scholars continue to think about
classification in terms of control.46 Why?
One set of explanations argues that they keep returning to control
because some particular feature of the law or its application pushes them to
do so. The "feature" in question is often broad, like a failure to adapt given
changing modes of production, or the fact that courts often engage in
formalist rather than purposive analyses of employment statutes.47 It is also
often foundational to labor and employment law, like when scholars argue
that our troubles arise from the inherent difficulty of distinguishing between
the "contracting" and "producing" phases of employment relationships as
the law essentially requires us to do.48 Whatever the cause, the end result is
that law fails to accurately regulate labor because it ties employee status to a
kind of direct and active interference in worker autonomy.
Because law is the problem in these accounts, law is also the solution.
Regulators should have different tests, different defaults, or different
interpretive rubrics, so they can more accurately identify control in work
with ERISA's purpose; consequently, they rejected it. Darden v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 796 F.2d 701,
705-06 (4th Cir. 1986), overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318 (1992).
45. Davidov, supra note 40, at 367-68 ("Over the years, however, some courts-unsatisfied with
the tests in their arsenal-have begun formulating a second test, this one aimed at the economic
dependence of the worker.").
46. See, e.g., Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067, 1075 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Cunningham-
Parmeter, supra note 40, at 1677 ("scrutinizing the many sublayers of control" in order to outline "new
methods for thinking about the concepts of 'control' and 'employ' that remain central to modem
employment").
47. See, e.g., KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE, at ix (2004) (discussing changes in work practices that demand new
forms of regulation); Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification ofAmerican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV.
1527, 1530-32 (2002). On the importance of purposive statutory analysis, see, e.g., Brian A. Langille &
Guy Davidov, Beyond Employees and Independent Contractors: A View From Canada, 21 COMP. LAB.
L. & POL'Y J. 7, 12 (1999); Linder, supra note 19, at 187. See also Rachel Weiner & Lydia DePillis, How
Congress Can Make Life Better Jbr Uber Drivers and Bike Messengers, WASH. POST (June 3, 2015),
http://wapo.st/lcytlM6?tid=ss tw-bottom&utm term-.3e485df68733 (quoting Sen. Mark Warner, D.-
Virginia, as saying that "[the sharing economy] is a tidal change in the relationship between an individual
and the workplace .... It's stunning that nobody in Washington is talking about this"). It might even be
that courts misrecognize the purpose of work law, in that they wrongly prioritize efficiency over other
values like the ability to be free from subordination in a democratic society. STEPHEN F. BEFORT & JOHN
W. BUDD, INVISIBLE HANDS, INVISIBLE OBJECTIVES: BRINGING WORKPLACE LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
INTO FOCUS 4-7 (2009) (making a similar argument with respect to work law's devaluation of equity and
voice); Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the PlaOform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10 HARV.
L. & POL'Y REV. 479, 500-05 (2016).
48. Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 315.
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relationships. In a pinch, they can draw on other areas of the law-antitrust
is an emerging favorite-to mitigate the failings of the specific legal
infrastructure governing work.49 But arguing that some longstanding feature
of "law" is responsible for failures to accurately understand and regulate
some feature of "society" does not explain why even critics find it so difficult
to let go of that feature, and it has the unfortunate side effect of reifying law
as a thing that exists apart from and above the social world.
Conversely, another approach as been to say that courts, scholars, and
even workers keep returning to control because they embrace the law's
narrow, formalist conception of freedom as non-interference and find it
meaningful.5 ° For example, some taxi drivers might prefer to be independent
contractors because they genuinely feel this classification signals and
enables greater autonomy than the category "employee."51 Likewise, courts
might find independent contractor status to be both an accurate signal and
effective source of "entrepreneurial opportunity.52 Since this type of
argument also posits that legal categories are themselves historically
contingent-say, in the way that the independent contractor classification
became linked with entrepreneurship and freedom during the heyday of
twentieth century neoliberalism-it is especially adept at acknowledging the
mutually constitutive nature of law and society.53 But precisely because it is
so good at explaining why legal constructions of control gain social salience
as well as how they are socially informed to begin with, this approach tells
us little about why generations of scholars, workers, legislators, and judges
have felt that control-based analysis just isn't doing the trick.
In the end, we cannot explain the stickiness of control-based analysis
49. See, e.g., Sanjukta M. Paul, Uber as For-Profit Hiring Hall: A Price-Fixing Paradox and its
Implications, 38 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 233, 235 (2017); Dubal, supra note 15, at 123 ("Advocacy
on behalf of taxi workers, for example, may involve engaging antitrust laws, regulatory laws, unfair
competition laws, and even corporate laws."). See also Ryan Calo & Alex Rosenblat, The Taking
Economy: Uber, InJbrmation, and Power, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1623, 1675 (2017) (advocating the use of
consumer protection law). Intriguingly, both the antitrust and consumer protection arguments depend on
taking seriously the platform argument that workers are consumers vis-h-vis the platforms through which
they provide services.
50. See Dubal, supra note 15, at 112 (drawing on ethnographic research among San Francisco taxi
drivers for the observation that "though many [immigrant and non-white] drivers recognized the potential
stability of being an employee, the status made them feel more out of control of their everyday lives").
51. Id. See also Yuval Feldman et al., What Workers Really Want: Voice, Unions, and Personal
.Contracts, 15 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 237, 248 (2011) ("In other words, employees might gain more
from personal contracts in terms of sense of influence and control, although in many cases they will have
more limited bargaining power compared to unionized employees.").
52. FedEx Home Delivery, Inc. v. NLRB, 563 F.3d 492, 497 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
53. Dubal, supra note 15, at 89-95 (tying the increasing importance of entrepreneurial opportunity
in classifying workers to the rise of neoliberal ideology beginning in the 1970s).
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without also accounting for the longstanding sense that it is inadequate.
Likewise, we cannot explain control's shortcomings without accounting for
the fact that year after year, in court after court, and even for some of the
workers whom it seemingly shortchanges, control and the categories it gives
rise to continue to present a compelling vision of what it means to have or
lose freedom at work. We can resolve both halves of the puzzle by
understanding that our classification system has really been predicated on
measuring freedom (not control), and that the common law control test
captures one-but only one-of the two conflicting ways in which lay and
legal actors think about freedom at work.
Because this is an exercise in chasing complicated concepts, it can be
helpful to begin with the lived experiences of actual people and in
environments that are relatively transparent. The ethnography that follows
combines these advantages to reveal a tension in the way workers think about
freedom that, in later sections, can also be seen in work law itself.
II. FREEDOM AT WORK IN THE SHARING ECONOMY
The "sharing economy" refers to a broad set of companies that use
technology to offer products and services in a highly disaggregated,
individualized way. Not all sharing economy companies actually present
work regulation issues, which is why most scholarly and policy commentary
(not to mention judicial and legislative engagement) has been concerned
with a limited subset of this space. I refer to those companies that actually
pose labor and employment law issues as "platforms" and I distinguish them
from others within the broader sharing economy (that I have elsewhere
referred to as "renters" and "swappers") on the grounds that platforms do
more than apply new technology to old practices and are more than virtual
bulletin boards for third parties.54 Rather, platforms actively participate in
the transactions they give rise to and occasionally substitute themselves for
government safeguards.55 For this reason, when we talk about work
regulation in the sharing economy, we are really just talking about platforms.
54. See Deepa Das Acevedo, Regulating Employment Relationships in the Sharing Economy, 20
EMP. RTS & EMP. POL'Y J. 1, 3-10 (2016) (arguing that platforms participate in the transactions they
facilitate and substitute themselves for governmental safeguards, in contrast to "Renters" like Zipcar or
"Swappers" like Couchsurfer).
55. Id. It has become commonplace to preface any discussion of the sharing economy with the
claim that there are no satisfactory taxonomies or definitions of this new space and by presenting a new
taxonomy that can fill this definitional gap. See, e.g., Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 49, at 1466. But
scholarship on the sharing economy is a few years old now and most commentators speaking from within
scholarly or policy contexts have an understanding of what they and others are really interested in, even
if that understanding is Potter Stewart-like in its articulation. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197
(1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
[Vol. 91:793
2018] UNBUNDLING FREEDOM IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 807
The ethnography presented in this Article was conducted largely but not
exclusively in Philadelphia from 2016 to 2017. I participated in application
and training processes for sharing economy companies, worked for a few of
those companies, and engaged in distance-education classes for aspiring
online workers.56 I also observed online chat forums and discussion threads
catering to platform workers at a national (and sometimes international)
level.5 7 In addition to these forms of participant-observation, I conducted
semi-structured interviews or informal conversations with platform workers,
worker advocates, policy analysts, and municipal officials.58 Lastly, I
benefited from the prior efforts of journalists, analysts, industry experts, and
advocates who conducted their own research and whose work, whether
published for a general audience or directly shared with me, complemented
and enriched my own ethnography.59 One of these interlocutors rightly
observed that fine-grained, qualitative data is essential to the task of
questioning the cohesive, statistics-based narratives put forward by
56. 1 applied for admission to the following sharing economy companies, not all of which are
"platforms" according to the definition I use here and elsewhere, see supra note 54 and accompanying
text: TaskRabbit, Instacart, Postmates, Rover, and Gigwalk. I was accepted by Instacart, Rover, and
Gigwalk, and completed Instacart's in-store training session, but did not work any shifts; I performed one
"gig" on Gigwalk; and I established one client relationship (involving multiple visits) on Rover. I also
viewed videos and completed online quizzes for the introductory course offered by Samaschool, anonline
provider of digital skills and intemet-based work training that heavily incorporates platforms into its
curriculum but does not exclusively focus on them. See SAMASCHOOL, http://www.samaschool.org (last
visited Aug. 14, 2018).
57. Scholars working on the sharing economy are increasingly mining online chat forums because
of the relative difficulty in accessing sufficient numbers of platform workers for large-scale analysis and
because opinions voiced on the forums have not been elicited for research purposes. See, e.g., Shu-Yi Oei
& Diane M. Ring, The Tax Lives of Uber Drivers: Evidence fom Internet Discussion Forums, 8 COLUM.
J. TAX L. 56, 66-72 (2017) (using data from Reddit.com, Uberpeople.net, and the Intuit TurboTax
AnswerXchange Forum and discussing methodological approaches to the use of online discussion forums
as data sources); Alex Rosenblat & Luke Stark, Algorithmic Labor and Information Asymmetries: A Case
Study of Uber's Drivers, 10 INT'L J. COMM. 3758, 3760 (2016) (using data from five unnamed Uber
driver chat forums).
58. Although all the non-workers with whom I spoke are identified by name in this Article, I have
anonymized all conversations with workers. This choice reflects a concern expressed to me by many
workers about being identified while making critical comments regarding their platforms, even in the
context of an academic research project. Indeed, I generally did not note down worker names in my field
notes even though many of the workers I spoke with gave me their personal phone numbers for follow
up conversations (I instead identified them by an interlocutor number, date, and location of interaction,
much as they are referenced in footnotes below). I did record names for a few workers with whom I
developed closer relationships, but our conversations continued based on an assumption of anonymity
and are presented here accordingly.
59. A few of these interlocutors, all of whom have been giving the issues surrounding platform
labor careful thought for some time now and were generous enough to share their insights with me,
include Kate Bahn, Todd Brogan, Harry Campbell, Ben Davis, Nicole DuPuis, Emily Guendelsberger,
Kirk Hovenkotter, Michael McCall-Delgado, Jeremy Mohler, Mel Plaut, Alex Rosenblat, Becki Smith,
and Katie Unger.
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platforms regarding the true nature of this work and what it means for our
regulatory system.60 This Article uses ethnography to further that goal.
A. FREEDOM AS NON-INTERFERENCE
Workers suggest that the freedom afforded by platform labor is of three
types: nobody tells me when to work, how to work, or how much I can earn.
When stated this way, the autonomy-enhancing potential of the sharing
economy is striking, as is the degree to which it contrasts with anything we
might legally understand as employment. Although subsequent sections of
this Article will show that this view of platform work rests on a narrow
conception of freedom, there is no gainsaying the set of choices that platform
workers can and do make as well as the real value of being able to describe
your work using "I" statements.
61
Consider Sam, a late 30s African-American man who drives for UberX
(one of the company's lower cost services) and occasionally works as a
TaskRabbit tasker.62 Sam has been driving for Uber ever since he lost his job
last year as a technician for a major cable and internet provider, and he
recently started doing some light furniture assembly and home r pair work
via TaskRabbit. He aims to drive around five hours per day and usually does
this weekdays from 5-10 a.m. in order to catch the morning hospital and
office crowds, and because it allows him to take care of his two children after
school while his wife works. He never works weekends.
Driving is not Sam's passion, but he enjoys chatting with passengers,
setting his own schedule, and listening to his favorite music or playing games
on his smartphone in between rides. He especially doesn't miss the erratic
schedules of his old technician job, which stressed him out and tied him up
for most of the day, nor does he miss the local coordinator who (Sam feels)
gave him especially rough timings because of personal animosity and who
60. Telephone Interview with Alex Rosenblat, Analyst, Data and Society (Aug. 11,2016). See also
Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 49, at 1634 (drawing on Rosenblat's ethnography of Uber drivers).
61. A survey of nearly 1,200 Uber and Lyft drivers revealed that 75.9 percent prefer to be
independent contractors. Harry Campbell, 2018 Uber and Lyft Driver Survey Results,
THERIDESHAREGUY (Feb. 26, 2018), https://therideshareguy.com/2018-uber-and-lyft-driver-survey-
results-the-rideshare-guy.
62. Sam is a composite figure based on my conversations with many platform workers. Sam's
demographic qualities are not intended to be representative of workers in any industry vertical or region:
the few independent, large scale surveys we have of platform workers suggest that they are mostly young,
white, and male. Still, his story reflects those of many of my interlocutors. On the profile of sharing
economy workers, see, for example, DIANA FARRELL & FIONA GREIG, JP MORGAN CHASE & CO. INST.,
PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE PLATFORM ECONOMY: BIG DATA ON INCOME VOLATILITY 22
(2016); ANDREW JIANG ET AL., THE 2015 1099 ECONOMY WORKFORCE REPORT, REQUESTS FOR
STARTUPS 30-39 (2015); Campbell, supra note 61.
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frequently criticized him for not completing jobs quickly enough. Moreover,
he very much enjoys his TaskRabbit assembly work because it allows him
to build tangible objects instead of just installing modems or fixing wires.
Sam does not know exactly how much he earns from his platform work.
For a month before Christmas he also drove weekday afternoons, which got
the family through the holidays but made it harder for him to estimate his
average weekly take-home. He has not calculated his net income, but knows
whether he earned less in a day than he spent on fuel that morning, he saves
all his fuel receipts for tax purposes, and he figures that his TaskRabbit work
involves no expenses at all except that new tool belt he bought two weeks
ago.63 When he first lost his job, Sam briefly thought about moving to an
industry competitor or even getting a temporary retail or fast food job
because of the hourly wage guarantee. In the end, however, he and his wife
decided that their scheduling needs and his well-being pointed them towards
platform work instead.
Sam's story reads as one of intrepidity and relative convenience in the
face of economic volatility, and indeed many platform workers (to say
nothing of platform companies) articulate a similar, largely positive narrative
of what it means to work in the sharing economy. But just as the glib
presentation of platform work as easy and entrepreneurial hides far less
pleasant realities, it also masks or trivializes the more meaningful positive
aspects of this work.6 4
63. Many observers comment on the degree to which worker participation and satisfaction is
dependent on a poor grasp of the financial realities of platform work or, at the very least, as a kind of
bimodal distribution where the peaks represent considerable savvy and considerable ignorance. One
researcher noted that many workers' "financial logic is 'whenever you're making money you're doing
well' but that "former professionals ... are keeping spreadsheets at home." Another felt that "even the
folks who are making it work" fail to account for things like sick days, unexpected expenses, and vacation
time as lost earning time. Telephone Interview with Alex Rosenblat, Analyst, Data and Society (Aug. 11,
2016); Telephone Interview with Katie Unger, Independent Labor Consultant (Aug. 8, 2016). My own
fieldwork reflects the bimodal distribution of financial sophistication. See, e.g., Telephone Interview with
TaskRabbit Tasker #1 (Sept. 12, 2016) ("1 don't do enough to pay any taxes on it, I'm exempt from taxes
on it... because (a) I'm on a woman-owned business ... and (b) I don't make enough ... to pay B&O
taxes on it ... I still have to claim the income but you know it's nominal."); Interview with Uber Driver
#8, in Phila., Pa. (July 30, 2016) ("I'm supposed to be [tracking my expenses but] it's too
complicated... I'm gonna see after tax season how it worked out.").
64. Some of the more striking accounts of the realities of platform work include, Josh Dzieza, The
Rating Game: How Uber and Its Peers Turned Us into Horrible Bosses, THE VERGE (Oct. 28, 2015),
https://www.theverge.com/2015/10/28/9625968/rating-system-on-demand-economy-uber-olive-garden;
Emily Guendelsberger, I Was an Undercover Uber Driver, MY CITY PAPER (May 7, 2015),
http://mycitypaper.com/uberdriver; Sarah Kessler, Pixel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in the Gig
Economy, FAST COMPANY (Mar. 18, 2014), https://www.fasteompany.com/3027355/pixel-and-dimed-
on-not-getting-by-in-the-gig-economy.
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To begin with, setting one's own schedule is about far more than mere
convenience.65 Indeed, many workers describe this aspect of their platform
participation using language that smacks of empowerment and
independence: "I never drive more than six hours a day" or "I only drive
weekends."66 On the one hand, the ability to turn off an app or put a profile
on hold allows workers to assert the primacy of their own priorities rather
than allow them to play second fiddle to an employer's timetable. On the
other hand, platform work involves no reporting to supervisors-human or
otherwise. There are no punch cards, no time sheets, and no bosses walking
past desks. "I like Uber," one driver said, "because [driving a] taxi is eight
to eight, nine to nine."67 He added that he chose to drive full time rather than
work in a casino like one of his brothers or in the family gas station business
like another brother because he doesn't like having to keep a schedule or deal
with a boss.
68
Likewise, not having a boss means more than having flexible schedules:
it can also mean (within boundaries) the ability to embody flexible work
styles to a degree where workers seem to be determining what he work is.
An Uber driver can choose to put on some Hip Hop music in between
passengers (or some high-decibel classical music with passengers in the car),
just as she can decide to stay parked between rides instead of immediately
65. Some commentators have suggested that platform workers enjoy even more freedom than the
ability to decide when they will be available for work by opening a smartphone app or activating an online
profile. In this view, even when workers are "active" on the platform, they can decide not to work because
they have the option to decline client requests. However, as others have pointed out, this is simply the
freedom we all possess to resist the demands of our jobs knowing that such resistance will produce
disciplinary action or termination. Compare SETH D. HARRIS & ALAN B. KREUGER, THE HAMILTON
PROJECT, A PROPOSAL FOR MODERNIZING LABOR LAWS FOR TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY WORK: THE
"INDEPENDENT WORKER" 9 (2015) ("Even if she does not turn off either app, she is not obligated to pick
up any particular customer."), with Ross Eisenbrey & Lawrence Mishel, Uber Business Model Does not
Justify a New 'Independent Worker' Category, ECON. POL'Y INST. (Mar. 17, 2016),
https://www.epi.org/publication/uber-business-model-does-not-justify-a-new-independent-worker-
category ("Uber drivers cannot keep their app on and monitoring potential riders and refuse to accept
rides without incurring serious consequences, including being deactivated (i.e., fired) for having too low
an 'acceptance rate."'). Note that Uber changed its official policy regarding deactivation in 2016 and that
now, drivers should not be deactivated for low acceptance rates, but rather be subject to the smaller
disciplinary measure of a temporary "time out" by being involuntarily logged out of the app. Harry
Campbell, How to Take Advantage of Uber's New Acceptance Rate Policy, THERIDESHAREGUY, (Aug.
5, 2016), https://therideshareguy.coml/how-to-take-advantage-of-ubers-new-acceptance-rate-policy
(describing the old acceptance rate policy, the new "time out" policy, and the benefits of being able to
take longer to accept requests).
66. Interview with Uber Driver #19, in Phila., Pa. (Aug. 14, 2016) (stating no more than 6 hours
per day); Interview with Uber Driver #34, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 3, 2016) (stating only weekends).
67. Interview with Uber Driver #35, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 3, 2016).
68. Id.
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driving to a high-density area or vice versa.69 An Airbnb host can decide to
allow guests to check themselves in (or not), to provide breakfast (or not),,
and to decide how many sets of linens are essential to successful hosting.
70
In other words, platform workers lack the over-the-shoulder supervision
paradigmatic of traditional production or service jobs. Although this by itself
does not make them unusual-taxi drivers and long-haul truckers are well-
known examples7 1-it adds to the sense that they conduct their work lives in
the relative absence of supervisory intervention.
Finally, just as there is no supervisor to set Sam's schedule or tell him
how to go about doing his work, there is also no supervisor rejecting his
application for a raise or limiting his overtime hours. I do not mean to say
that platform workers believe they can earn exceptionally large (much less
unlimited) sums because they are only restricted by their own willingness to
work or, more cynically, because they are only limited by their ability to
game the platform's algorithm. Some workers undoubtedly do still approach
their platform labor with this attitude,72 but they are likely rare; the
conversation among workers and observers alike has come a long way from
Uber's childhood boasts of $90,000 annual incomes.
73
Instead, when platform workers speak of their ability to control their
own earning potential they tend to describe definite, but decidedly
circumscribed goals: $200 per day, for example, or $200 per week, or enough
to cover a particular expense like travel or car payments; the specificity of
these goals represents a balance between their financial needs and their other
priorities.74 That is to say, the "freedom to earn" associated with the sharing
69. Interview with Uber Driver #42, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 12, 2016) ("You leave, I put on some
Spanish music. . . some hip hop .... I like it."); Interview with Uber Driver #37, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 4,
2016) (playing loud classical music during the ride); Interview with Uber Driver #57, in Phila., Pa. (Oct.
3, 2016) (waiting for twnty to thirty minutes, then targeting high-demand areas); Interview with Uber
Driver #14, in Phila., Pa. (Aug. 6, 2016) (remaining parked in between rides).
70. See generally What 2 Things Do You Wish You Knew Before You Started Hosting,
AIRBNBHOSTSFORUM.COM (Sept. 27, 2016), https://airhostsforum.com/t/what-2-things-do-you-wish-
you-knew-before-you-started-hosting/8133/37 (allowing users to recommend how to host).
71. Marc Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the National Labor Relations Act:
Making Room jbr Uncontrolled Employees, Dependent Contractors, and Employee-Like Persons, 66 U.
DET. L. REv. 555, 556 (1989).
72. See, e.g., Over/Uber, Comment to Advice to Addictive Personalities, UBERPEOPLE.NET (Jan.
30, 2017), https://uberpeople.net/threads/advice-to-addictive-personalities.137449 (describing the "rush
of thinking the 'system' or competing drivers have been outsmarted, the rider outwitted").
73. See Matt MacFarland, Uber's Remarkable Growth Could End the Era of Poorly Paid Cab
Drivers, WASH. POST (May 27, 2014), https://wapo.st/TOpLVu?tid=ss tw-bottom&utmterm
=.282f4583ee7d ("According to Uber, the median wage for an UberX driver working at least 40 hours a
week in New York City is $90,766 a year.").
74. Interview with Uber Driver #34, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 3, 2016) (describing a $200 per week
goal); Interview with Uber Driver #51, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 30, 2016) (describing a $200 per day goal);
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW
economy is often understood as the freedom to set income ceilings rather
than the freedom to break them, but it is nonetheless valuable to workers.
Platform workers are neither deluded nor unusual for valuing the
freedom to make their own decisions regarding scheduling, work style, and
earning potential-nor, for that matter, are they alone in associating this
freedom with independent contractor classification. Non-white immigrant
taxi workers in the Bay Area, for instance, have strongly preferred to be
independent contractors rather than employees (to the point that San
Francisco taxi drivers as a whole were unable to vote themselves into
employee status when given the opportunity to do so by city government)
because they attach symbolic and practical consequences to each
classification.
75
For these drivers, the often degrading experience of being a non-white
taxi driver is somewhat mitigated by the knowledge that they do not work
for anybody and by the cultural capital that this generates within their social
circles.76 More concretely, immigrant drivers worry that employee status will
allow leasing officials to give free rein to their prejudices by enforcing
specific dress and grooming requirements as well as by giving immigrant
drivers the worst cars and schedules.77 Drivers also (quite rightly) associate
the universally despised practice of short-term or "day" leasing with
employee status and worry that the problems of day leasing-such as long
hours wasted in line waiting to be assigned a car, daily bribe payments to get
better cars, and the generally demeaning treatment meted out by leasing
officials-will only be exacerbated by a return to the classification scheme
under which it was originally developed.78
As the worries of taxi drivers and the satisfactions of platform workers
suggest, conceptualizing freedom at work as non-interference ("nobody tells
me when to work, how to work, or how much I can earn") is just that and no
more: the freedom to not have another human being interfere in one's work-
related choices. Perhaps the salience of this limited vision of freedom means
that it is uniquely disempowering to have a fellow person order us about.
79
Interview with Lyft Driver #2, in Phila., Pa. (Mar. 22, 2017) (stating that he drives enough to cover his
car payments).
75. Dubal, supra note 15, at 69, 112-20. There may be parallel divisions in the rideshare context
based on full-time versus part-time status rather than on race. See Campbell, supra note 61 ("When
comparing full-time vs part-time drivers, we see a slight preference toward employee status from full-
time drivers but a majority still want to be independent contractors.").
76. Dubal, supra note 15, at 117 20.
77. 1d. at 113-15.
78. ld. at -11-14.
79. Indeed, Pettit-quoting Kant, who was responding to Rousseau-says omething like this
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This would certainly be in line with arguments that human action is uniquely
effective at stopping the flow or impact of accountability---of acting as a
"moral crumple zone" when essentially autonomous technologies
malfunction-because it too emphasizes that our cultural and legal
conceptions of responsibility are still centered on the individual agent.80 Or,
perhaps it suggests that interference is more demeaning when it is discrete
and direct (like an order to report for work at 7 a.m), rather than when it is
incremental, structural, or indirect (like when implicit bias in customer
reviews eventually triggers deactivation from an app).81 Regardless, the
meaningfulness of this vision of freedom is real and it is reasonable, even if
the underlying concept is exceptionally narrow and thus problematic. And
because this understanding of freedom is explicitly defined by the presence
or absence of control, it can make control-based categories powerfully
meaningful for workers even when there is good reason to think those
workers ultimately suffer as a result of a classification system based on
control.
Even policy analysts and workers' advocates sometimes find the idea
of freedom-as-non-interference compelling, inasmuch as they sometimes use
it to typologize platforms for the purposes of analyzing and responding to
platform-related problems.8 2  But separating "labor platforms" (like
when he observes that "[f]ind himself in what condition he will, the human being is dependent on many
external things... But what is harder and more unnatural than this yoke of necessity is the subjection of
one human being under the will of another. No misfortune can be more terrifying .... " PETTIT, ON THE
PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 44.
80. M.C. Elish, Moral Crumple Zones: Cautionary Tales in Human-Robot Interaction 1-2 (We
Robot, Working Paper Presented at We Robot Conference, 2016) (on file with author) (explaining "moral
crumple zones" in the context of human-machine systems like airplane cockpit control and nuclear plant
emergency protocols, and stating that "humans at the interface between customer and company are like
sponges, soaking up the excess of emotions that flood the interaction but cannot be absorbed by faceless
bureaucracy or an inanimate object"). Not having a human "crumple zone" is important for "employer"
perceptions of self as well as lay or legal perceptions of the alleged employer. See, e.g., Lilly Irani,
Difference and Dependence among Digital Workers: The Case ofAmazon Mechanical Turk, 114 S. ATL.
Q. 225, 226-27 (2015) ("The transformation of workers into a computational service.., serves not only
employers' labor needs and financial interests but also their desire to maintain preferred identities; that
is, rather than understanding themselves as managers of information factories, employers can continue to
see themselves as much-celebrated programmers, entrepreneurs, and innovators.").
81. Noah Zatz, Beyond Misclassification: Gig Economy Discrimination Outside Employment Law,
ON LABOR (Jan. 19, 2016), https://onlabor.org/beyond-misclassification-gig-economy-discrimination-
outside-employment-law (discussing "the simmering concern about how customer feedback ratings may
hard-wire discrimination into the supervisory techniques of gig economy platforms").
82. FARRELL & GREIG, supra note 62, at 5; Aaron Smith, Gig Work, Online Selling and Home
Sharing, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 17, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/l1/17/gig-work-
online-selling-and-home-sharing; Interview with Sarah Leberstein, Attomey, Nat'l Emp't Law Project,
in N.Y.C., N.Y. (July 28, 2016); Telephone Interview with Rebecca Smith, Deputy Director, Nat'l Emp't
Law Project (Aug. 30, 2016).
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TaskRabbit and Rover) from "capital platforms" (most notably, Airbnb) is
neither conceptually easy nor, if we are concerned with workers' welfare, is
it manifestly desirable. For instance, ridesharing is usually slotted into the
"labor" category even though it requires a significant capital investment
because ridesharing, like dog-walking or furniture assembly, involves
personal services performed by the worker. But UberBLACK drivers can
have commercial accounts listing multiple individuals who actually do the
driving and who split earnings with the account holder;83 conversely, many
Airbnb hosts personally undertake part or all of the considerable labor
involved in hosting.84 The fact that most Uber drivers actually do the driving
themselves while many Airbnb hosts outsource their maintenance work does
not reflect anything intrinsic to the way the platforms work.
From a workers' advocacy perspective, the suggestion that capital
platforms are different-that they merely constitute a "side income" stream
and are meaningfully less like employment than labor platforms-relies on
the idea that a task is not "work" if someone has not directly forced you to
undertake it at a given moment, in a given manner. Yet the same analysts
and advocates who distinguish between labor and capital platforms often
point out that algorithmic management techniques significantly restrict
workers' freedom (making them more like employees) even though the
techniques generate few discrete, unavoidable demands and involve little
direction by any human being.85 Moreover, algorithmic management is
hardly limited to a specific platform or even a specific kind of platform:
Airbnb and Rover equally engage in algorithmic management when they rely
on data-driven evaluation systems.86 There may be other reasons to
83. Add Me to Another Driver-Partner's Profile, UBER, https://help.uber.com/h/c736a696-3eac-
422a-a7f7-7d61e532d7c8 (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
84. Indeed, the personal labor of Airbnb hosts has interesting implications for the acceptability of
pink- and blue-collared work. Juliet B. Schor, Does the Sharing Economy Increase Inequality Within the
Eighty Percent?: Findings from a Qualitative Study of Plat/brm Providers, 10 CAMBRIDGE J. REGIONS,
ECON. & SOC'Y 263, 272-75 (2017) (discussing how platforms are getting white collar workers to
perform pink- and blue-collar work by presenting the work as novel and technologically advanced). Pink
collar work is work that is neither "white collar" (professional or managerial) nor "blue collar" (manual,
whether skilled or unskilled); it is traditionally associated with clerical and secretarial .office work, but
often extends to other forms of personal service work that are similarly dominated by women. Emily
Stoper, Women's Work, Women's Movement: Taking Stock, 515 ANN. AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. So. 151,
156 (1991) (discussing pink collar jobs in the course of analyzing approaches to reducing the wage gap
between men and women).
85. REBECCA SMITH & SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT'L EMP. L. PROJECT, RIGHTS ON-DEMAND:
ENSURING WORKPLACE STANDARDS AND WORKER SECURITY IN THE ON-DEMAND ECONOMY 4 (2015).
86. Lee et al., who first applied the term "algorithmic management" to platform work, describe it
as a phenomenon enabled by "software algorithms that assume managerial functions and surrounding
institutional devices that support algorithms in practice." See Min Kyung Lee et al., Working with
Machines: The Impact of Algorithmic and Data-Driven Management on Human Workers, 33 ANN. ACM
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distinguish between "labor" and "capital" platforms, like understanding how
class and race operate in the sharing economy, but understanding how to
regulate work and how to safeguard workers' rights are not self-evidently
among them. 87
This is not to say that any particular commentator wholly subscribes to
a negative conception of freedom-as-non-interference-again, the central
argument of this Article is that lay and legal actors do not wholly subscribe
to any one way of thinking about what it means to be free at work (and
neither does our work law). Rather, it simply goes to show that the idea of
individual autonomy undergirding control-based analysis tends to inform
analytic categories regardless of both one's policy preferences and the role
one inhabits with respect to the sharing economy.
There is also no question that the freedom described here is thin, not
simply because it is contained in a few discrete and sometimes trivial types
of decision-making, but also because those instances of decision-making are
only free from interference if we draw a tight circle around what actually
constitutes "interference."88  Platforms restrict workers' choices by
establishing cutoffs and penalties for various behaviors, including the rate at
which workers accept client requests, the speed with which they accept hem,
and the rate at which they cancel accepted requests.89 Some platforms
establish fairly specific codes of conduct or limit the services a worker can
offer unless she reaches an elite status.90 And of course, Uber and Lyft seek
CONF. ON HUM. FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYS. 1603 (2015). They go on to study three "algorithmic
features" of rideshare platforms: "passenger-driver assignment, the dynamic display of surge-priced
areas, and the data-driven evaluation that uses acceptance rates and ratings." Id at 1604. See generally
Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 57 (seeming to expand this understanding of algorithmic management by
also including minimum fares, rate cuts, and dispute resolution within its ambit). Regardless of one's
exact definition of algorithmic management, both "labor" and "capital" platforms clearly engage in it.
87. Indeed, not all of the labor and employment problems considered by commentators who draw
this distinction pertain to the regulation of work: sometimes, as with the JPMorgan report, labor and
capital platforms are distinguished from one another because doing so tracks meaningful differences in
who is participating, as well as how and why they are participating.
88. 1 understand interference as the "removal, replacement or misrepresentation of one or more
options" available to an individual. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 46. It is worth
noting that Pettit views the attachment of a penalty as the "replacement" of one option with another that
is different and less desirable (though perhaps not by much). Id. at 53. He also considers
"misrepresentation" to include any action that "denies you the possibility of making a choice on the basis
of a proper understanding of the options on offer" and lists "mesmerizing you with the prospect of
extraordinary rewards" as one way of doing this. Id. at 55.
89. Das Acevedo, supra note 7, at 42-43 (discussing these and other types of discipline established
by platforms); Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 57, at 3761.
90. Id. at 43-44 (discussing elite statuses). On codes of conduct, see Katie Benner, Airbnb Adopts
Rules to Fight Discrimination By its Hosts, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 8, 2016), https://nyti.ms/2cw2lsD, for a
description of Airbnb's new "community commitment" to non-discrimination that new and returning
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to manipulate drivers' personal choices regarding where and when to drive
by using dynamic pricing.91 The thinness of freedom-as-non-interference is
such that the very things workers value-say, the ability to set earnings
goals-are the means for platforms to shape worker behavior in ways that
benefit platforms but not workers.
92
Although scholars and policy analysts increasingly view these practices
as restricting worker choice in meaningful ways, the practices are unevenly
viewed as interferences in personal freedom by workers themselves and
(with the equally uneven exception of ridesharing) are unrecognized as such
by courts.93 But that is precisely the point: platform control remains largely
invisible because it does not follow the model of a X dictating to a Y on
discrete matters at particular moments.94 This does not mean that workers
and observers feel that platform labor involves no loss of freedom-simply,
as we will see, that the freedom they see being threatened is of a very
different sort than the type of non-interference described above.
B. FREEDOM AS NON-DOMINATION
Critics of the sharing economy argue that the liberating potential of this
space has been drastically oversold and that platform labor generates
uncertainty, conformity, and obsequiousness-all symptoms of
domination-that are incompatible with freedom at work. According to this
view, it does not matter so much that Uber, Rover, and Airbnb regularly
discipline workers who cancel client requests, or that customers on these
users must agree to before they can make bookings on the platform and Airbnb 's Nondiscrimination
Policy: Our Commitment to Inclusion and Respect, AIRBNB https://www.airbnb.com/help/article
/1405/airbnb-s-nondiscrimination-policy--our-commitment-to-incusion-and-respect (last visited Aug.
16, 2018), for a description of Airbnb's detailed non-discrimination policy-mostly geared towards
hosts-that is powerfully reminiscent of Title VII and the ADA.
91. See Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 57, at 3765-71 (discussing surge pricing). This is not to say
that surge pricing succeeds in "mesmerizing" drivers into behaving according to the wishes of
platforms-"don't chase the surge" is standard advice to new drivers-but interference is not predicated
on successful manipulation. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 55 56; Rosenblat & Stark,
supra note 57, at 3766.
92. Noam Scheiber, How Uber Uses Psychological Tricks to Push Its Drivers' Buttons, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 2,2017), https://nyti.ms/2nMmDtc (discussing the use of earnings goals, among other things,
to shape driver behavior "without giving off a whiff of coercion").
93. For instance, rideshare drivers complain frequently about acceptance rate and surge pricing
policies, but seem to take less issue with elite status policies. See Lee et al., supra note 86, at 1603, 1608
(discussing disapproval of acceptance rate and surge pricing policies).
94. An English employment ribunal poked fun at the interpretation of worker behavior as the
result of good, but independently exercised business sense rather than as the product of a centralized
authority, stating that "[t]he notion that Uber in London is a mosaic of 30,000 small businesses linked by
a common 'platform' is to our minds faintly ridiculous." Aslam v. Uber B.V., No. 2202550/2015, at 28
(Emp.'t Tribunals Oct. 28, 2016).
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platforms discipline workers who do not meet their personal expectations-
it is not the actual interference in worker choice that produces domination.
95
Rather, it is that platforms and customers have the power to discipline (and
thus the power to restrict choice) if and when they feel like it and in
essentially unpredictable or unknowable ways.9 6 As a result of this
unchecked authority, workers live in a state of uncertainty to which they
respond by conforming their desires to the limits of the system and by
behaving with obsequiousness towards those who dominate them.
97
Take Alex, a retired Caucasian woman who rents her family's spare
bedroom via Airbnb and is also a Lyft driver.98 After a few years of
retirement, Alex and her husband decided to try homesharing because they
felt they should do more to ensure their own financial stability during their
golden years and because they wanted to help their struggling son with his
daughter's college tuition. Once they were more or less settled with their
Airbnb listing, Alex decided to give ridesharing a try as well, mostly out of
curiosity. Her husband does the cleaning and maintenance for their rental,
while Alex manages their online profile and is primarily responsible for
interacting with their clients.
99
Alex has always considered herself a friendly, easy-going person so she
was somewhat surprised to discover how invasive it initially felt to have
strangers in her car and her home. She understood how some drivers could
say that inviting strangers into their cars and making small talk for money
made them feel like "pimps," and although she didn't feel quite as strongly,
she was very aware of the fact that she had to provide a "service" while in
her own home and her own car.
100
95. In the neo-republican account, domination destroys freedom because it involves the power to
restrict choice regardless of whether or not that power is actually exercised. To be sure, where domination
leads to actual interference, the interference is itself also a manifestation of unfreedom. See, e.g., PETTIT,
ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 50.
96. Much of the neo-republican literature refers to this state of affairs as vulnerability to the
"arbitrary" will of another being, but Pettit rightly points out that modem English usage makes arbitrary
a misleading choice of words: what matters isn't the irrationality or unpredictability of the external will
imposing itself upon you, but the fact that that will is uncontrolled by you in any meaningful sense.
Compare Rogers, supra note 47, at 500 (using "arbitrary"), with PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra
note 9, at 58 (preferring "uncontrolled interference" to "arbitrary interference").
97. Pettit uses the terms "adaptation" and "ingratiation" instead of servility, but-at least in the
employment context-these do not quite capture the sense of self-abnegation that I think worries critics.
PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 64-65.
98. Like Sam, Alex is a composite figure.
99. See Schor, supra note 84, at 272-74 (discussing the performance of pink and blue-collar tasks
by white collar platform workers).
100. One of the Uber drivers I interviewed said just this about his early experiences as a driver. He
coped by switching off the app after completing just one ride per day until, after a few days, he felt he
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Eventually, though, she started focusing on how to be a better host and
driver. She would look carefully for mannerisms and word choices that
indicated her clients' moods, and experiment with different behaviors,
questions, and phrasings to see what reactions she got."'0 As she got better
at doing all of this, and as she started thinking of her work as providing
something that people really needed, she started to enjoy herself more. One
of her favorite tricks now is to ask for restaurant recommendations from her
rideshare passengers but give restaurant recommendations to her homeshare
guests-she doesn't need to ask any more than her guests (who could always
check Yelp) need to be told, but in each context her tactics seem to make
clients feel good.
Still, Alex remains slightly worried about some aspects of her platform
work. For instance, she is especially sensitive to the fact that guests might
complain about food odors in her home since her husband is Indian and
cooks often.0 2 One of her very first guests did in fact note the smell in his
review. It wasn't a major criticism-he made a few other suggestions as
well-but Alex is convinced that the smell was the reason he gave her a four-
star rating. More experienced hosts whom she encountered on an online chat
forum reassured her by saying that four stars was fine for an early review
and even gave her tips on how to moderate food odors. Still, Alex is always
a bit anxious when a guest walks in for the first time-and also when they
walk out for the last time at the end of their stay.
She's also a little concerned that one of her guests will have a problem
with the fact that her family is interracial. She hasn't faced any explicit
instances of discrimination yet, but she has heard stories of frosty guests and
inexplicably low reviews and is wary. Still, she knows that there is little she
can do since Airbnb's anti-discrimination policy-which she has read in
painstaking detail-is more geared towards protecting guests than protecting
hosts.10 3 So she does her best to preempt the situation by being extra friendly
was sufficiently desensitized to handle more passengers without communicating his discomfort through
his conversation. It took two more weeks for him to be comfortable driving full time. Interview with Uber
Driver #24, in Phila., Pa. (Aug. 20, 2016).
101. Another driver who emphasized his interests in psychology noted: "Sometimes somebody gets
in your car and the best customer service you can provide is to say nothing ... you can tell almost
automatically... some people don't have that gear but I know when to talk, when not to talk." Interview
with Uber Driver #26, in Phila., Pa. (Aug. 31, 2016).
102. Food smells are a common topic of conversation on the Airbnb hosts' forum. See, e.g., Guest
Refqses to Stay Due to Smell?, AIRBNBHOSTSFORUM.COM (June 28, 2016), https://airhostsforum.com
/t/guest-refuses-to-stay-due-to-smell/5859; How Much Does Indian Food Smell Matter to Others?,
AiRBNBHOSTSFORUM.COM (Oct. 11, 2016), https://airhostsforum.com/thow-much-does-indian-food-
smell-matter-to-others/8855.
103. See Airbnb 's Nondiscrimination Policy, supra note 90.
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and accommodating.
Food odors and prejudices against interracial couples are obviously not
a problem in her work as a driver but Alex is worried that, now that she's
finally got the hang of it, Uber is going to switch to driverless cars and all
the other rideshare companies, including Lyft, will follow suit. She's actually
really grown to like her driving: doctors rushing to work in the morning and
businesspersons late for meetings are always so grateful that she feels like a
hero, and thanks to Lyft's tip feature they can and do express their
gratitude. 104 There was a week back in December when the money was so
good (and their granddaughter's spring tuition was almost due) that she
couldn't stop driving and started to get worn down from the lack of sleep. 1
05
Alex's story does not read as one of terrible sadness or subordination to
either her platforms or her customers, and it is not meant to. Yet the absence
of freedom is a terrible thing-if Alex is not considerably unhappy and does
not feel constantly thwarted in her work by being made to do things or obey
orders that impinge upon her autonomy, why would we consider her
unfree?
10 6
In a word: uncertainty. Workers and observers are noting with
heightened frequency and levels of eloquence that the experience of
providing services in the sharing economy is marked by an overwhelming
level of uncertainty-uncertainty regarding the requirements for gaining or
maintaining access to the app, uncertainty regarding client expectations,
uncertainty regarding situations where the two clash, and even uncertainty
regarding how long the entire system will exist in its current form.
None of these uncertainties need actually produce bad outcomes for
104. Workers-not just within the sharing economy-do often describe their efforts in somewhat
heroic language. See, e.g., Dubal, supra note 15, at 119 ("As a taxi driver, I'm navigating San Francisco
streets. My customer's lives are in my hands as I take them from place to place. I am handling a
weapon."); Interview with Uber Driver #50, in Phila., Pa. (Sept. 19, 2016) ("I'm a superhero [because I
get people to work]."). Uber has also added a tip feature in its app. Darrell Etherington, Uber Tipping Is
Rolling Out to 121 U.S. and Canadian Markets Today, TECHCRUNCH (July 6, 2017),
https://techcrunch.com/2017/07/06/uber-tipping-is-rolling-out-to- 121 -u-s-and-canadian-cities-today.
105. One of the drivers I spoke with expressed all these sentiments at once. Interview with Uber
Driver #55, in Phila., Pa. (Oct. 1, 2016) ("1 was Ubering so much I wasn't getting much sleep ....
Sometimes I do get a little angsty, I wanna get out there ... you know, tuition's due. The sad part [is that]
I was thinking about retiring in four years ... now Uber's talking about driverless cars in four years so
what I'm gonna do?").
106. To be clear, I am not using "unfree" in the sense that historians of nineteenth century labor law
do. See, e.g., ROBERT J. STEINFELD, COERCION, CONTRACT AND FREE LABOR IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY 33 (2001) (calling "unfreedom" the "coercion of labor through threats of corporal punishment
or confinement"). Rather, I am using "unfreedom" to signal a less technical sense (albeit more aligned
with agency law) that an individual's actions are not her own to control.
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workers. The unknown platform requirements might be effortlessly met,
clients might not have idiosyncratic expectations, the two sets of demands
might never come into conflict, and (notwithstanding Alex's fear of
driverless cars) major changes might always hover just beyond the
horizon.10 7 Indeed, regulatory and technological hurdles make the worry
about rideshare drivers training their own replacements less compelling than
is sometimes suggested.'0 8 Nevertheless, it remains that the only thing that
workers like Alex can be sure of is the power of the platform and of the client
to constrain their options in any circumstance. It is an authority that is always
there, waiting to be exercised, and the waiting creates uncertainty. 
109
To be sure there is uncertainty in all things and all jobs, and it is equally
true that American work law has a peculiarly high tolerance for uncertainty
as signaled by its embrace of at-will employment. 10 The problem is not so
107. Changes need not only be of the job-negating variety. When TaskRabbit overhauled its system
in 2014 from a bidding format to a selection and assignation format, it too effected systemic changes of
the type being discussed here. Colleen Taylor, Through the Fire: What TaskRabbit Learned From Its Big
Backlash, TECHCRUNCH (Jan. 21, 2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/01/21/through-the-fire-what-
taskrabbit-learned-from-its-big-backlash.
108. But cf Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 49, at 1631. As rideshare expert Harry Campbell notes,
technological obstacles to driverless cars are often both overestimated and underestimated. On the one
hand, Tesla models are just a shade away from being able to do the work of navigating roadways. On the
other hand, driving-especially driving for hire-involves far more than successfully decelerating or
changing lanes. What happens when an Uber passenger vomits in a driverless vehicle? Or when a
temporary roadblock is erected halfway down a one-way street? There will surely be technological fixes
for these issues, but Campbell suggests that we are far from having them on hand. Moreover, he suggests
that given the thickness of regulatory infrastructure in the United States, driverless transportation-
whether in the form of individual cars or something analogous to Hyperloop-is likely to debut in a more
flexible environment (with his personal pick being Dubai). Telephone Interview with Harry Campbell,
TheRideshareGuy.com (Apr. 17, 2017).
109. There are certainly strong connections between "uncertainty" on the one hand and
"vulnerability" (as in the work of Martha Albertson Fineman) and "dependence" (as under the economic
realities test) on the other hand. However, I have used uncertainty because it seems to best capture the
source of platform workers' vulnerability to and dependence on their platforms and consumers. See
generally Sec'y Labor v. Lauritzen, 835 F.2d 1529, 1534 (7th Cir. 1987) ("For purposes of social welfare
legislation, such as the FLSA, 'employees are those who as a matter of economic reality are dependent
upon the business to which they render service."') (citations omitted); Martha Albertson Fineman, The
Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251 (2010) (arguing that vulnerability and
dependence are inescapable aspects of the human condition and criticizing the extent to which they are
overlooked in liberal law and policy analysis). Vulnerability has also been important to calls for a
purposive approach to worker classification. See, e.g., Davidov, supra note 40, at 361.
110. Over the course of the nineteenth century, the default rule for employment in the United States
came to be that it exists "at will" -that is, so long (and only so long) as both parties are willing to uphold
the contract. An employer does not have to offer cause or notice for terminating an employee, and vice
versa. This principle, often called Wood's Rule for its ostensible origins in Horace Gray Wood's 1877
treatise Master and Servant, is usually captioned as allowing termination for "good reason, bad reason,
or no reason at all." See, e.g., Paul M. Secunda, Constitutional Employment Law. Zimmer's Intuition on
the Future of Employee Free Speech Law, 20 EMP. RTS & EMP. POL'Y J. 393, 405 (2016). The uniquely
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much that workers lack a script laying forth all the future twists and turns of
their gigs, jobs, or working lives, but that the script they do have, bare bones
as it is, is also at any time susceptible to alterations that are not of their
choosing and may be intentionally hidden from them.
Uncertainty of this type constrains autonomy without ever rising to the
level of direct interference because it makes it impossible for workers to
exercise meaningful choice. When an Uber driver accepts every ride request
she receives but is told she did not meet the acceptance rate requirement to
qualify for a guaranteed hourly wage, she has no information with which to
counter Uber's assertion and, consequently, no way to judge her best future
course of behavior.' 11 Her safest bet is to continue accepting all possible ride
requests in the hope that Uber's assessment and her own assessment of her
acceptance rate will eventually match up. Similarly, when a Fiverr worker
does not know what will catapult her into the highest category of elite
workers ("Top Rated Seller") she has no way of choosing among an array of
possible behaviors or business decisions in order to access the very real
benefits that come with Top Rated Seller classification. 112
Inasmuch as it forces workers to operate blindly, uncertainty also leads
workers to literally and figuratively embody the domination they
experience. 13 One paradigmatic way to respond to the unchecked authority
of another is to curry favor with the authority figure so that she will minimize
American nature of Wood's Rule does not explain the dissatisfaction with control-based analysis I
describe here because similar criticisms of control as an analytic rubric have been voiced in other contexts
lacking at-will employment. See JEREMIAS PRASSL, THE CONCEPT OF THE EMPLOYER 1-7 (2015)
(discussing, primarily in the context of English law, the problem with control-based analysis that seeks
to identify "employees"); Rachel Amow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-ReJbrming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1, 48-57 (2010) (discussing the non-at-will systems in Canada, the UK, and various
European countries); Langille & Davidov, supra note 47, at 15-16 (noting the importance of control to
Canadian worker classification doctrine in a section titled "Our 'Traditional' Problem").
111. Calo & Rosenblat, supra note 49, at 1665.
112. Fiverr's Level System, FIVERR, https://www.fiverr.com/levels (last visited Aug. 16, 2018).
Fiverr is an odd-job platform where clients can hire workers to perform a range of tasks, including
anything from translating a document to designing a website. The platform began with the premise that
all tasks would cost just $5, but it has since expanded its pricing approach into a complex system whereby
workers gain the right to tailor the cost and nature of the services they offer as they climb Fiverr's
internally constructed hierarchy of elite service provider statuses. See Das Acevedo, supra note 7, 42-43
(discussing vetting and termination standards and the benefits that come with elite statuses across several
platforms).
113. See Noopur Raval & Paul Dourish, Standing Out From the Crowd: Emotional Labor, Body
Labor, and Temporal Labor in Ridesharing, 19 ACM CONF. COMP.-SUPPORTED COOPERATIVE WORK &
SOC. COMPUTING 101 ("' Pleasing the passenger' is clearly an aspect of any ridesharing system, including
traditional taxis, but it plays a much bigger role in crowd labor due to the specific intermediation of
quantitative scores.").
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her interference in your choices.114 Obsequiousness is neither necessarily
painful nor gaudy: most of us like to please, and-as many rideshare drivers
attest-sometimes ilence itself is pleasing enough. What obsequiousness
(even the silent variety) expresses, however, is the powerlessness of the
person who embodies it. "Several [Uber] drivers said the best way to behave
is like a servant," noted one journalist, before going on to quote a driver in
Sacramento who characterized her own role by saying that "' [t]he servant
anticipates needs, does them effortlessly, speaks when spoken to, and you
don't even notice they're there."'
1 I5
Though it may seem otherwise, obsequiousness is about more than
exercising "natural" tact. Rather, it is a way of recognizing the particular
social game being played and of obeying its rules. 1 16 Smiling to make others
happy, curating conversations to boost others' egos-the emotional labor
performed by platform workers concretizes the power of clients and
algorithms through the worker's own physical gestures and speech
patterns.117 For instance, after a Lyft driver noted a sudden decrease of 0.1
in his rating, he started attempting to establish a conversational rapport with
passengers "very quickly" because "[t]hat's what they"-meaning both
passengers and Lyft--"want. Accommodate and connect."118 Emotional
labor is nothing new, of course, and even within the sharing economy, it is
hardly limited to either rideshare drivers or verbal interactions.1 19 But the
114. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 64-67.
115. Dzieza, supra note 64.
116. Erving Goffman's classic account of face-to-face encounters as "games" is particularly visible
in the one-to-one or one-to-many interactions of the sharing economy. Goffman notes that in games like
checkers or chess, the rules of the outside world are more or less suspended during the course of the
interaction. ERVING GOFFMAN, ENCOUNTERS: TWO STUDIES IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF INTERACTION 26
(1961). When platform workers perform emotional labor, they are following their own internal "rules of
the game" by ignoring gender and class stereotypes attached to pink and blue-collar tasks. Schor, supra
note 84, at 272-74.
117. Arlie Hochschild's understanding of emotional labor remains definitive, as does her classic
"flight attendant" illustration:
The flight attendant does physical labor when she pushes heavy meal carts through the aisles,
and she does mental work when she prepares for and actually organizes emergency landings
and evacuations. But in the course of doing this physical and mental labor, she is also doing
something more, something I define as emotional labor. This labor requires one to induce or
suppress feeling in order to sustain the outward countenance that produces the proper state of
mind in others-in this case, the sense of being cared for in a convivial and safe place. This
kind of labor calls for a coordination of mind and feeling, and it sometimes draws on a source
of self that we honor as deep and integral to our individuality.
ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE MANAGED HEART: COMMERCIALIZATION OF HUMAN FEELING 6-7
(1983).
118. DRider85, Comment to Uber and Lyft Should Get Rid ofl5 Star Ratings, UBIERPEOPLE.NET
(Feb. 1, 2017), https://uberpeople.net/threads/uber-and-lyft-should-get-rid-of-5-star-ratings. 137751.
119. Written communication style-punctuation, vocabulary, and the use of politeness conventions,
for example-reflects and shapes "real-world" dynamics. Naomi S. Baron and Rich Ling, Necessary
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sheer ubiquity of emotional labor makes it no less telling a sign of
dependence on another's will.
Because emotional labor and obsequiousness are unsuccessful where
they are obviously insincere, workers must also at least partly conform their
preferences to the constraints, actual or potential, that are placed upon
them.120 This too is neither necessarily painful nor outlandish. If one's
options are good ratings that produce a host of benefits-more income, elite
statuses, perhaps an hourly wage guarantee-and bad ratings that produce
their inverse-and perhaps deactivation-then it is natural to honestly prefer
the former, and indeed, it is difficult to do otherwise.121 Account after
account of platform work emphasizes how seriously workers take such
markers of success, not only because they translate into more desirable
outcomes, but because they validate the decision to commit to platform labor
itself. "I've got currently twelve excellent-service and nine great-
conversation badges," boasted one Uber driver (who is nonetheless looking
for another job).122 "It tells me where I'm at." 12 3 But in the neo-republican
account, while happiness-or at least, reduced frustration-may lie in
learning to want what you have rather than. having what you want, freedom
Smileys and Useless Periods: Redefining Punctuation in Electronically-Mediated Communication, 45
VISIBLE LANGUAGE 46, 55 (2011) (observing that female study participants "were vocal about the
importance of using emotion-tinged punctuation markers.., both to express their 'enthusiasm' for the
communications they were crafting as well as to soften messages that might otherwise seem overly
direct"). When a TaskRabbit tasker texts immediately after receiving a client request with a series of
short, enthusiastic questions liberally sprinkled with exclamation marks, she is not simply responding in
a naturally excited or voluble way, she is trying to ingratiate herself with her client by demonstrating her
interest in service as much as the Uber driver who unnecessarily asks her clients about restaurants.
The centrality of emotional labor simply places platforms at the tail end of a very long line of
service jobs in which the work to be done encompasses much more than the cleaning of a bathroom or
the distribution of in-flight beverages, and where the affective dimensions of that work-and the display
of pleasure in service-serve to refashion power disparities as good customer service. See generally
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 117; Robin Leidner, Emotional Labor in Service Work, 561 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 81 (1999) (discussing McDonald's fast food restaurants).
120. In this vein, Hochschild distinguishes "surface acting"-in which "we deceive others about
what we really feel, but we do not deceive ourselves"-from "deep acting"-in which "we make feigning
easy by making it unnecessary." HOCHSCHILD, supra note 117, at 33. She notes that "[tihe matter would
be simpler and less alarming" if workers were "allowed to see and think as they like and required only to
show feeling (surface acting) in institutionally approved ways" but that "[s]ome institutions have become
very sophisticated in the techniques of deep acting; they suggest how to imagine and thus how to feel."
Id. at 49.
121. Indeed, in one of the earliest first-hand journalistic accounts of platform work (and in the
context of an article that was otherwise rather critical of the workings of ridesharing), Emily
Guendelsberger observes that she was "weirdly proud" of the fact that she maintained a perfect five-star
rating during her first few days as an Uber driver. Emily Guendelsberger, supra note 64.
122. Scheiber, supra note 92.
123. Id.
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emphatically does not.124
This is not to say that platform workers are automatons who feel what
is wanted and want what is given (even though it can sometimes eem that
way).'25 Critique and resistance abound, whether this consists of venting on
chat forums, contesting client accounts of interactions, strategizing within
the bounds of the system-as when workers try to game the algorithms that
determine search results or that allot front page placement on their platforms'
websites-and it may even involve operating outside the bounds of the
system itself-as when workers go "off app."'126 But these acts of agency
occur within a particular framework and using a particular set of idioms and
intuitions; they are part and parcel of the system they ostensibly subvert.
Consequently, while they might demonstrate dissatisfaction with the rules of
the game, they do not fundamentally break with the game itself.
127
124. PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 65.
125. See Scheiber, supra note 92 (describing various tools or approaches that Uber has developed
using behavioral science insights to control driver desires as well as driver actions, including: having
Uber employees adopt female personas when interacting with drivers, exploiting the "ludic loop"
phenomenon by setting random, but concrete and constantly-shifting goals (e.g., "you're $5.25 away from
earning $330!"), offering work statistics and feedback in formats akin to video game scores to trigger
competitive urges, and capitalizing on inertia and loss aversion by using automatic queuing features like
"forward dispatch" to keep drivers on the road).
126. Anthropologists have been thinking of resistance as more than self-conscious group protest for
some time now. Sally Engle Merry, Resistance and the Cultural Power of Law, 29 LAW & SOC'Y REV.
11, 15 (1995) (describing the movement toward understanding resistance as consisting of "subtle,
unrecognized practices, such as foot-dragging, sabotage, subversive songs, and challenges to the law's
definition of personal problems in court"). See generally Rosenblat & Stark, supra note 57 (conducting a
study of Uber driver chat forums that also speaks to the way drivers contest passenger and platform
narratives). On "gaming" the system, see, for example, Nick Loper, How I Got on the Homepage ofFiverr
and Earned $920 in 10 Days, SIDE HUSTLE NATION (Apr. 21, 2014), https://www.sidehustlenation.com
/fiverr-homepage-eamed-920-in-10-days (describing several strategies for achieving a high-ranking on
search results or a platform webpage). See also Advice to Addictive Personalities. Post of Over/Uber,
UBERPEOPLE.NET (Jan. 30, 2017), https://uberpeople.net/threads/advice-to-addictive-personalities
.137449 (describing the "rush of thinking the 'system' or competing drivers have been outsmarted, the
rider outwitted").
Lastly, several commentators as well as several of my own interlocutors have described the
practice of"going off app" by concluding an initial transaction or establishing repeat transactions directly
between the worker and consumer. See, e.g., Kessler, supra note 64 (describing her initial guilt at
accepting payment "off app," but subsequent willingness to do so because of the unexpected difficulty in
acquiring gigs); Conversation with Rover client #1, in Phila., Pa. (Jan. 19, 2017) (during which the client
assumed we would schedule all sessions offthe app); Interview with Uber Driver #25, in Phila., Pa. (Aug.
31, 2016) (describing the same practice involving ridesharing); Telephone Interview with Blow Me
Worker #1 (Aug. 11, 2016) (describing how the stylist met new clients via the app and scheduled
subsequent sessions with them directly).
127. In other words, the uncertainty generated by the power dynamics of platform work-as well
as the conformity and obsequiousness it prompts-constitute a "habitus," or system of embodied
tendencies that are "structured structures predisposed to function as structuring structures." PIERRE
BOURDIEU, OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF PRACTICE 53 (1977).
2018] UNBUNDLING FREEDOM IN THE SHARING ECONOMY 825
When critics decry the imbalance of power between clients and
platforms on the one hand and workers on the other, they are appealing to an
understanding of freedom of non-domination rather than as non-interference.
If only interference was at issue, the ability to ingratiate oneself with clients
(and also with algorithms) and to thereby pursue one's livelihood relatively
unmolested would raw analogies to liberation, not servility. Likewise, if the
sum total of freedom was the ability to avoid frustration, it would be enough
to constantly recalibrate one's preferences in light of new constraints and
interferences. That neither the one nor the other is the case suggests that
workers and observers also subscribe to a vision of freedom that the sharing
economy does not enable. It is this failure that drives talk of regulatory
dysfunction or breakdown with respect to platform work, and that underlies
dissatisfaction with control-based classification even outside the platform
context.
C. CONFLICTING, NOT CONCENTRIC FREEDOMS
Taken together, Sam and Alex reflect worker experiences across a range
of platforms, but, more importantly, they embody two distinct ways of
experiencing (or not experiencing) freedom at work. Sam's ability to make
choices about when he works, how he works, and how much he earns, as
well as the absence of a supervisor monitoring his performance, all
reasonably contribute to a sense that he is free because someone else is not
directly forcing him to engage in or refrain from particular actions.
Conversely, Alex's worries about dealing with prejudicial or idiosyncratic
clients, her reservations about having to behave obsequiously in her own car
and home, and even her gradual enjoyment of the subservient role she had
initially disliked, all signal her loss of freedom-as-non-domination. One is
not simply broader than the other; rather, freedom-as-non-interference and
freedom-as-non-domination are conflicting rather than concentric or additive
concepts.
Non-interference is grounded in discrete, direct exercises of authority
("Pick up Joe Smith on Main Street, now!"). This is the kind of instruction
someone like Sam is glad to be rid of, and labor and employment scholars
rightly associate it with industrial and factory-based forms of labor that are
a diminishing component of our work landscape. But the sort of freedom that
someone like Alex is missing out on, freedom-as-non-domination, would not
be captured by a broader "functional" understanding of authority because it
is fundamentally distinct.
For example, even though Alex may not be given a specific order to
"pick up Joe Smith," she might know that if she does not pick up a large
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enough percentage of Joe, Jack, and John, she will be terminated from the
app. The trouble is that Alex is not quite sure what that magic percentage is
or whether she and Lyft will agree on when she's met it, so Alex is not really
free to reject any of those passengers. A broader definition of control would
not solve her problem. Likewise, the constraints on her freedom do not arise
from whether or not Lyft actually directs her to "pick up Joe on Main Street,
now." What would make Alex feel freer in the non-domination sense if she
knew beforehand that picking up Joe and Jack would ensure that she met her
daily acceptance rate.
This means that the difference between freedom-as-non-interference
and freedom-as-non-domination is one of kind rather than degree. More
importantly, it means that regulators cannot satisfy both conceptions of
freedom by simply expanding the circle of "employees" or by understanding
"control" more expansively. Control-based analysis is inherently tied to the
idea that a worker's freedom is impinged upon when an employer dictates
the "how, when, and where" of her work-that is to say, the "means and
manner" of performance. freedom-as-non-domination eed have nothing to
do with this sort of means and manner analysis. And because workers are not
alone in valuing both types of freedom, our labor and employment statutes
and case law reflect traces of freedom-as-non-interference as well as
freedom-as-non-domination.
III. FREEDOM(S) IN, AND THROUGH, WORK LAW
This Part explores how the ethnography discussed above illuminates a
fundamental tension in labor and employment law itself. It is one thing to
say that platform workers and observers are genuinely attached to different
visions of freedom at work, another thing to suggest that this dynamic can
also be found in our work law, and yet a third thing to argue that he tension
between these two conceptualizations of freedom explains our fixation-and
our dissatisfaction-with control-based analysis. So far, I have only made
the first of these claims, but in what follows I will make the second and third.
These arguments necessarily take us from the fine-grained, ethnographic
study of platform labor to the historical and doctrinal analysis of labor and
employment law writ large.
A. NON-INTERFERENCE AND NON-DOMINATION IN WORK LAW
Freedom-as-non-interference is undoubtedly more prominent within
labor and employment law (and arguably beyond it) than freedom-as-non-
domination. Few things convey the centrality of this way of thinking as well
as the overall primacy of the common law control test, but we can pick out
[Vol. 91:793
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other, more specific instances where an understanding of freedom at work as
non-interference shines through with especial clarity. Take the practice of
upfront contractual specifications ("UCS"), in which detailed descriptions of
the way work is to be done are included in independent contractor
agreements, but are presented by companies and often understood by courts
as evidence of the end product or service that is contracted for. 128 When
courts read UCS clauses as detailing the "ends" rather than the "means" of
performance, they understand them to support independent contractor
classification because, in part, UCS obviates the need for human monitoring
and scheduling.129 In other words, some courts-like some platform
workers-conceptualize freedom at work to be the absence of direct,
interpersonal authority rather than as the absence of the power to exert such
authority indirectly and without restriction.
For example, FedEx has successfully argued in several courts that the
terms of its lengthy and non-negotiable Operating Agreement did not
transform its drivers into employees because, among other things, the
agreement "suggested a limited need or interest in real-time supervision."13
0
To be sure, FedEx's position has been widely criticized and the judicial tide
may have started to turn against the company on this issue,131 but UCS is
hardly limited to one company or even one industry.132 Moreover, once we
grant the paramount importance of identifying control over the means of
performance, the frequently counterintuitive results in UCS cases become an
intractable-because they are unavoidable-problem. 1
33
128. Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 366 (describing UCS as "the setting forth of detailed and extensive
work rules in the written contract governing the work" and noting that it "is not just artifice disguising
the alleged employer's open-ended authority over production ... but to some extent meaningfully directs
the worker").
129. Id. at 368 (describing how many courts view upfront specification as removing the need for
supervision rather than encoding supervision into the contract).
130. Id. at 374 (discussing In re FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 869 F. Supp. 2d 942 (N.D. Ind.
2012)).
131. See, e.g., Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 981, 997 (9th Cir. 2014) (finding
that FedEx drivers are employees).
132. Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 368-76 (discussing several other examples of UCS analysis,
including EEOC v. North Knox School Corp., 154 F.3d 744, 748 (7th Cir. 1998) (describing UCS analysis
in a case involving school bus drivers); SIDA of Hawaii, Inc. v. NLRB, 512 F.2d 354, 358 (9th Cir. 1975)
(containing similar analysis involving taxi drivers); and Brown v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 31 Employee
Benefit Cas. (BNA) 2467, 2470 (N.D. I1l. Sept. 24, 2003), aff'd, 125 F. App'x 44 (7th Cir. 2004)
(containing similar analysis, but involving the employees of a Sears contractor that was responsible for
selling and installing home improvements like roofs, gutters, and fences)).
133. Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 325 (noting that the "UCS poses an intractable quandary for
evaluating claims of control in employment status disputes and that the conundrum is rooted in the
coritradictory incorporation of master-servant authority into contract"). The results in FedEx cases where
drivers are not found to be employees despite various forms of UCS-enabled authority seem
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We can see the importance of control and freedom-as-non-interference
outside the realm of worker classification, too. Consider the practice of
having workers contractually waive statutory protections like the ability to
litigate rather than arbitrate future claims, or the ability to mount claims
based on current or prior employment decisions in any forum.'34 The logic
in doing so is that when waivers are signed under conditions that are not
explicitly coercive, they represent choices made free of interference. 135 They
may even be said to advance freedom, inasmuch as they empower workers
to assess and realize the value of certain statutory protections by their own
lights.
But of course, waivers are signed in situations where choice is severely
constrained by asymmetrical knowledge and by asymmetrical power over
goods like jobs and severance packages.136 (There is also the very real
concern that waivers defeat public interests even when they truly advance
private ones, but "deregulat[ion] by contract" is an entirely different sort of
objection to statutory waivers. 137) Even where there is no interference of the
stranger-in-a-back-alley variety, it requires single-minded focus on the bare
act of assent to be able to say that the waiver itself expresses worker
autonomy. 138 That assent is important, to be sure, and it meaningfully
counterintuitive because they clash with a vision of freedom as non-domination. Take two of the practices
that FedEx presents in support of its position: drivers are free to subcontract heir routes and they are not
required to work specified hours. Alexander, 765 F.3d at 984-85. Both rightly suggest hat FedEx does
not engage in the kind of over-the-shoulder monitoring that would constitute violations of freedom-as-
non-interference because the company is not telling a particular driver that she herself has to work these
particular hours. Id. at 985. But drivers-and many commentators-feel that their freedom is nonetheless
compromised for reasons that reflect an understanding of freedom as non-domination. For instance,
drivers' ability to subcontract is at the unlimited discretion of company officials, which raises familiar
concerns like uncertainty and obsequiousness. Id. at 994. Likewise, drivers are not really free to work any
hours they want because FedEx engages in highly sophisticated calculations to ensure that every driver
works 9.5-11 hours daily, reports for pickup in the mornings, remains until all her packages are collected,
and delivers certain packages at specific times-in other words, FedEx artificially and unilaterally limits
drivers' freedom ex ante so that they can "choose" to do exactly what FedEx desires. Id. at 984-85.
134. See Eileen Silverstein, From Statute to Contract: The Law afthe Employment Relationship
Reconsidered, 18 HOFSTRA J. LAB. & EMP. L. 479, 482 (2001).
135. Id. at 511.
136. Waivers are generally assessed for indications that they were "knowing and voluntary," and
most courts make this determination using the capacious (and thus employer-friendly) "totality of the
circumstances" standard. Id. at 484, 491 n.67. Congress did enact more stringent requirements for
determining that a waiver was "knowing and voluntary" via the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act of
1990 (OWBPA), but most courts only apply the OWBPA's seven-step analysis in cases involving the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Id. at 488-92 & nn. 61 67.
137. Id. at 493.
138. And indeed, situations in which X changes the set of options available to Y (even by attaching
a reward to one of the options) or situations in which X deceives or manipulates Y into picking a specific
option are equally unlikely to constitute "free choice" under a vision of freedom as non-domination.
PETTIT, ON THE PEOPLE'S TERMS, supra note 9, at 50-56.
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differentiates contractual waivers from agreements made under conditions
of actual intimidation. But for our purposes, contractual waivers are
interesting for their signaling value more than for their substantive effect: the
fact that courts almost universally enforce waivers suggests that courts
dealing with employment contracts-like lay actors dealing with consumer
contracts-find a strictly non-interference model of free choice to be
compelling in some circumstances, however thin that freedom might appear
to critics. 
139
While work law is undoubtedly flush with examples of freedom-as-non-
interference, it is also relatively easy to spot instances where individuals have
tried-with varying success-to push the law toward a conception of
freedom-as-non-domination. 140 Perhaps most strikingly, labor republicans of
post-Civil War America directly drew on and refined the classical republican
understanding of freedom as part of their efforts to advertise the "structural
and personal domination to which a modem wage-laborer was subject."'
141
The open-ended authority of the labor contract, according to this new, more
radical interpretation, merely replaced the unfreedom of slavery with the
unfreedom of wage slavery.1
42
Nevertheless, republicanism petered out as the labor struggles of the
late nineteenth-century segued into the Lochner era and later on as New Deal
legislation sustained legislative and judicial onslaughts that revived the
common law test and its control-based analysis.143 The star surviving
example of this is the FLSA's definition of an employee as anyone who an
employer "suffer[s] or permit[s] to work," as well as its accompanying,
judicially-created test, that purports to measure the "economic realities" of a
work relationship rather than the quantum of control it involves.144 The
139. See Silverstein, supra note 134, at 484; Tess Wilkinson-Ryan, Intuitive Formalism in Contract,
163 U. PA. L. REv. 2109, 2110, 2127 (2015) (stating that just as modem contract doctrine posits that
"potentially enforceable deals (i.e., those that are supported by consideration and not illegal or
unconscionable)" should be upheld "when the parties have objectively manifested assent," ".[t]he fact of
assent seems, for the average consumer, to cleanse the transaction-to press the reset button, morally as
well as legally" on the issue of enforceability).
140. GOuREVITCH, supra note 9, at ch. 4. See also Carlson, supra note 3, at 310 (noting that "control
over work was never the exclusive test of status for either respondeat superior or other statutory
purposes").
141. GOUREVITCH, supra note 9, at 103.
142. Id.
143. Seeinjfa notes 155-56, 159-60.
144. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 USC § 201, §§ 203(d)-(e) (2012); Rutherford Food
Corp. v. McComb, 331 U.S. 722, 727-30 (1947) (applying the economic realities test to the FLSA). Of
course, the economic realities test was not originally limited to, or even articulated with respect to, the
FLSA. See, e.g., United States v. Silk, 331 U.S. 704, 717-20 (1947) (elaborating the economic realities
test in a case involving the Social Security Act); NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 127-29
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FLSA's emphasis on knowledge and power along with the economic
realities test's complementary emphasis on dependence make the
overarching-and not always actually exercised-authority of the employer
the basis of worker classification.14 5 As Section I.B noted, both the Act and
the test are open to numerous criticisms, not least of which is that their
vagueness produces judicial analysis suspiciously similar to what happens
under the common law test. But it remains that he FLSA and the economic
realities test represent concerted efforts to move away from a system that
compensates only for the loss of freedom represented by direct interferences
in a worker's will.
146
A similar conceptual move underlies the 2015 reassessment of the
standard for determining "joint employer" relationships as well as the NLRB
General Counsel's investigation regarding McDonald's liability for the
working conditions of its franchisees' employees. Together, Browning-
Ferris147 and the consolidated McDonald's inquiry created uproar in the
franchising world because they discarded an analytic framework that based
employee classification on direct interference in worker autonomy as the
basis for labor and employment protections. 148 Browning-Ferris announced
that the NLRB ("the Board") would henceforth only require a potential joint-
employer "possess the authority to control employees' terms and conditions
of employment" rather than actually exercise such authority. 149 Likewise, it
announced that the Board would acknowledge forms of control that were not
directly and immediately exercised by the potential employer; instead,
(1947) (articulating the rationale underlying the economic realities test in a case involving the NLRA);
Carlson, supra note 3, at 311-14 (discussing analysis consonant with the economic realities test in Lehigh
Valley Coal v. Yensavage, 218 F. 547 (2d Cir. 1914).
145. See, e.g., Katherine V. W. Stone, Legal Protections for Atypical Employees: Employment Law
Jbr Workers Without Workplaces and Employees Without Employers, 27 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L.
251,257-59 (2006).
146. Bruce Goldstein et al., Enforcing Fair Labor Standards in the Modern American Sweatshop:
Rediscovering the Statutory Definition of Employment, 46 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1043 (1999) (tracing the
historical meaning of "suffer or permit" and arguing that, in the state child labor statutes from which it
originates, the phrase meant that "when a business owner had the means to know and the power to prevent
acts proscribed by the legislature, it made no difference whether the owner's employee or an independent
contractor engaged a minor child to perform the work").
147. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
148. Erin Conway & Caroline Fichter, Surviving the Tempest: Franchisees in the Brave New World
of Joint Employers and $15 Now, 35 FRANCHISE L.J. 509, 515 (2016) (observing that the "change in the
NLRB employer test is vehemently opposed by the International Franchise Association (IFA) and
bemoaned as the end of franchising altogether by some") (citations omitted); David J. Kaufmann et al.,
A Franchisor Is Not the Employer of its Franchisees or Their Employees, 34 FRANCHISE L.J. 439, 448-
52 (2015) (discussing the dangerous implications of Browning-Ferris and the McDonald's inquiry on
business-format franchisors).
149. Browning-Ferris, 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186, at 2 (emphasis in original).
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control exercised via an intermediary would count as well. 150  The
McDonald's investigation put this approach into practice (although it is
worth noting that the General Counsel had initiated its inquiry well before a
decision was issued in Browning-Ferris). 1
51
In both instances, the Board abandoned a narrower understanding of
freedom where only direct commands framed as commands are held to
impinge a worker's autonomy, and instead adopted a broader understanding
of freedom in which the ability to elicit desired behavior warrants protection
even if it is not exercised via direct command or remains unexercised
altogether. The shift has been questionably successful: even though the
Board confirmed its approach in subsequent cases,152 Browning-Ferris was
eventually overturned by Hy-Brand Industrial Contractors (which was itself
later vacated). 15 3 But even though the new joint employer standard has been
neither particularly impactful nor long lasting-in fact, especially because it
has been neither impactful nor long lasting-it speaks to both the
gravitational pull of control-based analysis and the dissatisfaction it
occasionally produces.
B. TENSION, CONFUSION, OR FAILURE?
Even if distinct visions of freedom-as-non-interference and as non-
domination exist inside and outside work law, how can we be sure that the
tension between them is responsible for critics' seeming desire-and
inability-to move beyond control-based analysis? Perhaps legislators are
just responding to political pressure when they enact laws that promote
control and non-interference in spite of its poor fit with the realities of work.
Or, perhaps judicial actors are simply doing the best they can with vague
laws and complicated facts, but their efforts also fit poorly with the realities
150. Id.
151. NLRB Office of the General Counsel Issues Consolidated Complaints Against McDonald's
Franchisees and Their Franchisor McDonald's, USA, LLC as Joint Employers, NLRB.GOV (Dec. 19,
2014), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-office-general-counsel-issues-consolidated
-complaints-against.
152. In 2016, the Board affirmed and built on its Browning-Ferris precedent by holding that solely
employed workers and jointly employed workers need not obtain employer assent if they wish to form a
single (and otherwise appropriate) bargaining unit. Miller & Anderson, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 39, at 13-
14(2016).
153. See generally Hy-Brand Indus. Contractors, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 165 (2017). However, the
NLRB later vacated Hy-Brand and in 2018 undertook an unusual notice-and-comment rulemaking
process on the joint-employer standard. Board Vacates Hy-Brand Decision, NLRB.GOV (Feb. 26, 2018),
https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/board-vacates-hy-brand-decision; NLRB Considering
Rulemaking to Address Joint-Employer Standard, NLRB.GOV (May 9, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov
/news-outreach/news-story/nlrb-considering-rulemaking-address-joint-employer-standard.
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of work. Bad statutes or bad case law-with "bad" meaning sinister, ill-
conceived, archaic, or subject to internal contradiction (among other
things)--are, overwhelmingly, the way labor and employment scholars have
explained the continuing fixation and dissatisfaction with control-based
analysis among themselves and decisionmakers.154  Both of these
explanations are undoubtedly part of the answer, but they are not,
individually or even together, the whole answer. What's more, considered
by themselves, they paint a crude and starkly ungenerous view of all parties
involved.
Take the idea that control-based analysis persists because labor and
employment statutes overwhelmingly reflect the interests of elite actors (the
"legislative failure" argument).155 Political interests and constraints can
certainly explain some of the stranger features of our classification system,
including, for example, the exclusion of domestic and agricultural workers
from the NLRA or that of tipped servers and farm workers from the FLSA.
156
Politics can even explain some of the back-and-forth between differing
approaches to freedom at work, like the Taft-Hartley Act's restrictions of the
meaning of "employee" under the NLRA and Hearst. 1
57
But "legislative failure," though it offers some insights about our
love-hate relationship with control-based analysis, cannot explain that
relationship on its own. Suggesting otherwise invites a kind of legal nihilism
because it requires viewing law as nothing but a tabula rasa waiting to be
written on by select actors. It also invites a kind of legal exceptionalism
because it would mean that law has a singular power to change hearts as well
154. See infra notes 155, 159-60.
155. See, e.g., Linder, Towards Universal Worker Coverage Under the National Labor Relations
Act, supra note 71, at 555 (calling the Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA "[s]tatutory
encouragement" for "[o]ne of the successful tactics employers have used in recent years to rid themselves
of existing labor unions and to avoid collective bargaining"-namely the reclassification of employees
as independent contractors).
156. Sean Farhang & Ira Katznelson, The Southern Imposition: Congress and Labor in the New
Deal and Fair Deal, 19 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 1, 12-15 (2005) (describing southern efforts to shield the
remnants of antebellum work structures from the New Deal by carving out statutory exclusions for
predominantly black labor); Marc Linder, Farm Workers and the Fair Labor Standards Act: Racial
Discrimination in the New Deal, 65 TEX. L. REv. 1335, 1336 (1987) (same). See also Vivien Hart,
Minimum- Wage Policy and Constitutional Inequality: The Paradox of the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 1 J. POL'Y HIST. 319, 337 (1989) (discussing the original version of the FLSA and observing that
"because of the segregated, stereotyped, and regional structure of the job market, excluded workers were
disproportionately women and from minorities").
157. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns, 322 U.S. 111 (1944); Carlson, supra note 3, at 322-24 (discussing
Taft-Hartley as a response to Hearst); Dubal, supra note 15, at 82 84 & nn. 48-53 (discussing the
importance of business interests in motivating the 80th Congress's efforts to unravel New Deal legislation
and referencing prior scholarship arguing the same).
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as actions even among those whose interests it undermines. In other words,
this explanation requires us to think of law as both acultural and as wholly
constitutive of cultural traditions, and it calls on us to view any values
discernible in law as little more than "glosses on property relations."158 To
write this down is to demonstrate its impossibility. Beyond all this,
"legislative failure" sadly underestimates the importance of courts in
constructing, defending, and reformulating the building blocks of labor and
employment law. 1
59
The second argument ("implementation confusion") corrects for that
last shortcoming by putting the blame squarely on the way courts handle
labor and employment cases. In one understandably popular version of this
explanation, judges both perpetuate control-based analysis and occasionally
undermine it because the relevant legal precedent is confusing and statutory
guidance is in woefully short supply. 160 Another less frequently articulated
version of this argument suggests that courts have repeatedly embraced a
restricted vision of freedom-as-non-interference because it better aligns with
employers' interests and because, consciously or not, judges are predisposed
to sympathize with employers.161  When courts recognize thicker
understandings of freedom at work-as in Hearst, for instance, or in the
FedEx litigation, Browning-Ferris, 162 or Cotter163-it is because the realities
of work (and the interests of workers) have managed to assert themselves
158. Clifford Geertz, Deep Play: Notes on the Balinese Cockfight, in THE INTERPRETATION OF
CULTURES 412, 449 (1973).
159. Carlson, supra note 3, at 298; Jeffrey M. Hirsch, Employee or Entrepreneur?, 68 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 353, 360-61 (2011) (discussing the power of federal appellate courts, and especially of the
D.C. Circuit, with respect to labor law generally and the NLRB in particular).
160. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 40, at 1704 ("Many judges narrowly construe the
meaning of control because no clear standard exists to outline the boundaries of employer-employee
relationships."); Tomasetti, supra note 15, at 336 & n.1 10 (citing various scholars who argue that one
explanation for "the legal uncertainty regarding employment status is that the legal standards are
hopelessly imprecise and unwieldy").
161. Charles W. McCurdy, The "Liberty of Contract" Regime in American Law, in THE STATE AND
FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 161, 165 (Harry N. Scheiber ed., 1998) ("[N]o amount ofthoughtful revisionism
can erase the fact that the 'principle of neutrality' did not have a uniform operation ... the freedom of
contract decisions handed down by American courts beginning in the 1880s showed 'a definite bias of
policy' against statutes favoring 'the interest. . . of labor."'); Matthew J. Lindsay, In Search of "Laissez-
Faire Constitutionalism, " 123 HARV. L. REV. F. 55, 55, 57 (2010) (describing the "progressive" critique
of Lochner era jurisprudence as emphasizing the judiciary's identification "with the nation's capitalist
class" and its "contempt for any effort to redistribute wealth or otherwise meddle with the private
marketplace," and juxtaposing this with a second critique, according to which "the Lochner era is best
understood not as a politically motivated binge ofjudicial activism, but rather as a sincere and principled,
if sometimes anachronistic effort" to distinguish valid economic legislation and invalid "class"
legislation).
162. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Cal., Inc., 362 N.L.R.B. No. 186 (2015).
163. Cotter v. Lyft, Inc., 60 F. Supp. 3d 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
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despite these limitations.
"Implementation confusion" cannot offer an exhaustive solution to the
puzzle of control-based analysis any more than "legislative failure" because
it repeats the latter's errors, albeit in more complex fashion. To the idea that
the stickiness of control originates in legal infrastructure, "implementation
confusion" adds a new type of law (adjudicatory outcomes, whether by
courts or by agencies) and a new type of actor (courts, rather than just
legislatures). This adds nuance to the legal nihilism and exceptionalism from
earlier, but it does not fundamentally challenge the premise that law may
construct social norms without also being constructed by them. Likewise, to
the argument that the faultiness of control-based analysis stems from a class-
inflected divide between law and reality, "implementation confusion" adds
subtlety via implicit bias-"judges naturally think like employers"-rather
than explicit preference. But of course, this merely casts lures to the legal
realists inside many of us without doing justice to the sort of measured,
multivariate analysis of judicial behavior pursued by many New Legal
Realists themselves. 
164
Perhaps the most significant problem with these two explanations is that
they do not really notice or explain the fact that the tension between non-
interference and non-domination exists outside the law itself, in the vast
realm of "society." As Parts I and II showed, workers-and even some
commentators-who might be expected to find a thicker vision of freedom
at work uniquely compelling (and who often do find it compelling) also often
think of freedom-as-non-interference. This matters. Since critics of control-
based analysis fail to see that its faultiness and stickiness exist outside the
law as well as within it, they reasonably view the tension in work law as
emanating from a disjuncture between law and society. Once we see that this
tension exists both inside and outside the law, it becomes impossible to think
that a disjuncture between law and society-whether stemming from statutes
and legislators or case law and judges-is all that lies behind it. Something
else must also be at issue, something that does not reduce law to "glosses on
property relations," lawmakers to puppets (or puppeteers), or lay actors to
dupes. The missing piece of the puzzle is that we-workers, scholars, and
decision makers alike-have genuine commitments, visible in law and in
164. Scholars who might subscribe to the label "New Legal Realist" employ a variety of approaches.
See, e.g., Bryant Garth & Elizabeth Mertz, Introduction: New Legal Realism at Ten Years and Beyond, 6
U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 121, 123 n.10 (2016) (describing a "big tent" New Legal Realism that extends
beyond the quantitative and economics-oriented framework represented by Miles and Sunstein); Thomas
J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831, 834
(2008) (describing the understanding ofjudicial personality using "testable" metrics as "[a] distinguishing
feature of the New Legal Realism").
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everyday practice, to two different conceptions of freedom at work.
CONCLUSION
The tension between non-interference and non-domination that I have
outlined here explains decisions like Cotter v. Lyft far better than any
transformations in technology or employment practices. Precisely because it
was thorough and measured, Judge Chhabria's analysis exemplifies how
work law uses a single concept ("control") to try to capture a complex
empirical phenomenon ("freedom") as well as how the attempt often
produces stalemates and confusion.
For instance, several of the factors Judge Chhabria considered link the
concept of control to an understanding of freedom-as-non-interference: the
"great flexibility" drivers enjoy regarding "when and how often to work;"'165
their ability to select "parts of San Francisco in which they accepted ride
requests;"'166 and the "minimal contact with Lyft management" while
working as drivers.167 All of these factors interpret control to mean discrete
or direct restraints on driver autonomy; because the restraints did not exist,
control was also found to not exist.
Conversely, other factors considered by Judge Chhabria link control to
an understanding of freedom-as-non-domination: the "right to penalize" that
Lyft reserves to itself (whether or not that right is actually exercised);' 68 the
ambiguous standards on which such penalties can be based; 169 and, above all
else, the power that comes from the ability to terminate at will. 170 All of these
factors interpret control to mean a potential, and potentially unrestrained,
ability to limit driver autonomy; because Lyft did indeed possess such an
165. Cotter, 60 F. Supp. 3d at 1081.
166. Id.
167. Id. See also id. at 1078-79 (listing various behavioral controls imposed by Lyft, like "not to
talk on the phone with a passenger present").
168. Id. at 1079.
169. See id. (observing that "Lyft reserves the right to 'investigate' and 'terminate' drivers who
have 'behaved in a way which could be regarded as inappropriate"' and that termination might result
from declining or accepting and then declining "too many" ride requests).
170. Id. The "at-will" rule has interesting, shifting implications for the dual conceptions of freedom
I describe here. At-will employment is characterized by uncertainty and potential power formally
enjoyed by both parties, but in practice mostly beneficial to the employer. When the at-will nature of a
particular relationship is used to characterize it as one of employer-employee, the at-will rule is indexing
a loss of freedom as non-domination. But when taken generally, the rule represents a valuation of freedom
as non-interference: it is liberty-enabling because it eliminates all but the most minimal intrusions on an
employee's decision to work and an employer's decision to offer work. On the practical effect of the at-
will rule see, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Development o1 the Employment-at- Will Rule Revisited, 23 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 733, 736 (1991) ("Whatever its status as a formal presumption, Wood's rule represented a signal
to the courts to view skeptically employees' evidence of contracts of long duration.").
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ability, it was found to enjoy control over its drivers.
Cotter makes clear that work law cares about how people experience
freedom, that there are distinct ways to experience freedom, and that
decisionmakers cannot effectively subsume these distinct visions under a
single concept like control. When they do so, as Judge Chhabria was forced
to do based on prevailing California law, they are left with little but a morass
of crossed signals and repeat errors. So where do we go from here?
First, we acknowledge that freedom-as-non-interference is a relatively
thin concept with a remarkably thick and rich tradition in the United States.
This is true both among lay and legal actors, as well as in "law on the books"
and "law in society." It is simply not productive to dismiss a Lyft driver's
valuation of, say, scheduling flexibility on the grounds that it seems like a
shallow sort of freedom.
Second, we recognize that middle-of-the-road attempts to fix
classification doctrine by introducing new tests or new factors do not
succeed. This is not because non-interference and non-domination are
mutually exclusive in the abstract, but because, in practice, it is difficult to
consistently identify losses of freedom when freedom means two distinct
things. Decades of classification case law and scholarship attest to this fact.
The failure of median approaches suggests that our options for improving
classification doctrine lie at the extremes: either we enact piecemeal
regulatory reforms that address specific aspects of work relationships but
leave core conceptual issues as they are,171 or we undertake the profoundly
challenging task of regulating work relationships on the basis of something
other than the amount of control and freedom they permit.172 Piecemeal
regulations need not be inconsequential, and conversely, systemic hange
may not be better or feasible, but either approach would depart from previous
reform efforts by respecting and building on our dual conception of what it
171. Whether they are "piecemeal" or "systemic," the approaches I have in mind would focus both
on (1) reducing the importance of the "employer"-worker binary as a funneling mechanism for safeguards
and (2) searching for an analytic rubric other than control and freedom with which to funnel those
safeguards. In terms of piecemeal reforms, we might continue to distance health and retirement benefits
from worker classification in the vein of the Affordable Care Act and various "portable benefits" plans.
See supra note 28 and accompanying text; Deepa Das Acevedo, Addressing the Retirement Crisis with
Shadow 401 (k)s, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. ONLINE 38,41 & nn. 16-17 (2016). Or, we might say that since
Uber creates public risk when it facilitates transportation, it has to account for that risk to the public by
providing auto insurance or personal liability coverage to individual drivers. That kind of rule would not
require use to measure the amount of control in an "employer" worker binary, but it would still use that
binary to channel work-related safeguards.
172. Constructing a new analytic rubric for determining who gets work-related safeguards and
obligations may not be an impossible task, but it is certainly a daunting one and outside the scope of this
Article.
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means to have freedom at work.
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